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Introduction 
Accident prevention is more and more being recog-
nized as one of the functions of modern management. It has 
gained this status principally from an impersonal realiza-
tion of the true costs of accidents. Stated simply, fewer 
accidents result in lowered accident costa. In moat in-
stances, the cost of an effective accident prevention pro-
gram is much more than repaid by the savings effected 
through the reduction of accidents and their resulting 
costa. 
It has been generally concluded that the larger 
concerns, those employing over 500 persons, have been able 
to utilize accident prevention methods and techniques to 
such a complete degree that their accident frequency 
records have been better than those of smaller concerns 
engaged in the same or similar operations. Therefore, it 
would seem that a study of the accident prevention status 
of smaller concerns would be enlightening, since they rep-
resent the most troublesome area. 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine and 
evaluate accident prevention procedures and techniques 
employed by manufacturing concerns in the Greater Boston 
Area having more than 100 but leas than 500 employees. No 
attempt will be made to investigate occupational disease. 
From all indications, no inclusive studies have 
6 
been made of the problem as presented. Calls upon the 
Greater Boston Chamber of Commerce, the Massachusetts 
Safety Council, and the Division of Industrial Safety of 
the Massachusetts Department of Labor & Industries pro-
duced no information that would be helpful to this work 
except as background material. 
The approach to the problem will be twofold. 
First, the statistical results of a questionnaire sent to 
203 manufacturing concerns in the Boston area will be ana-
lyzed to see what is being done in the accident prevention 
field by these companies. Second, a few selected concerns 
in the same group will be studied to illustrate the pro-
blems of individual companies and to show how they have 
faced their safety problems. 
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I. The 11Why11 of Accident Prevention 
A. Defini tiona 
A personal injury accident, as defined by 
Heinrich, "is an unplanned and uncontrolled event in 
which the action or reaction of an object, substance or 
radiation results in personal injury."* It will be noted 
that an accident can occur and result in property damage 
without personal injury, and also that an accident can 
occur without personal injury or property damage. Acci-
dents as referred to in this thesis shall be of the per-
sonal injury type. 
Personal injury accidents may further be classi-
fied as major-injury or minor-injury accidents. A 
major-injury accident, better lmown as a lost-time acci-
dent, is defined by safety engineers as an accident re-
sulting iri an injury of such severity that the injured 
worker is unable to report for work on the next working 
day after the occurrence of the accident.* A minor-injury 
accident includes all other personal injury accidents. The 
injured worker may or may not receive first-aid for a 
minor injury depending upon the severity. Minor injuries 
are difficult to record properly since many are never re-
ported and many companies do not keep recorda of those 
* 2, p.l4 
* 20 
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accidents that are reported. 
Heinrich estimates that for every major-injury 
or lost time accident there are 29 minor-injury accidents 
and 300 no-injury accidents.* 
B. Costs of Accidents 
Accidents result in two types of costs to the 
employer, direct and indirect. The direct cost, or in-
sured cost, is relatively easy to determine from accounting 
records. The ease of determination is the basis of the 
classification of direct and indirect. The direct cost is 
the amount paid to employees as the result of workmen's 
compensation benefits, plus medical treatment costs, and 
usually plus an insurance overhead cost up to 40 per cent 
of the two previous costs. If a concern is insured with a 
private insurance company then the summation of these three 
items will appear as the Cost of Workmen's Compensation 
Insurance in the financial statement. The indirect cost is 
the amount for which no insurance provision has been made. 
It is "hidden" or "incidental" or "indirect" because much 
of it cannot be easily determined in dollars and cents. 
This cost is just as detrimental, and usually more signi-
ficant, to the profit position but is not as easily rec-
ognized or analyzed through financial records as is the 
direct cost. 
* 3, p.24 
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1. Direct Costs 
In Massachusetts workmen's compensation insur-
ance is compulsory for employers who employ four or more 
persons. Insurance may be provided by private insurance 
companies or the employer may be self-insured.-11- Insurance 
by private insurance companies is handled generally under 
one of the following plans: the experience rating plan, 
the adjusted manual rating plan, or the retrospective plan. 
These three plans and self-insurance will be explained 
briefly. 
a. Self-Insurance 
In self-insurance the assumption of responsibility 
for the payment of workmen's compensation benefits and med-
ical expenses, as dictated by the compensation laws, is 
assumed by the employer. The employer insures himself, 
so to speak. 
In order to qualify · as a self-insurer, an em-
ployer must prove conclusively to state authorities that 
he is able to meet this responsibility financially. 
To do this he must deposit securities of a cer-
tain aggregate amount so that payment of ·compensation will 
be guaranteed, he must file a bond for the same purpose, 
or he must in other ways furnish definite and concrete 
evidence of his ability to meet his responsibilities for 
* 17, p.3 
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compensation.* 
In Massachusetts private employers who wish to 
be self-insurers must obtain a license from the Department 
of Industrial Accidents which is good for one year. To 
obtain such a license, the employer must either keep on 
deposit with the State Treasurer cash or securities in the 
sum or market value of not less than $10,000, or furnish a 
surety company bond in at least the same amount. The 
Department of Industrial Accidents may at any time require 
additional deposits of cash or securities or additional 
bond, and also require the self-insurer to reinsure his 
compensation risk against a catastrophe.** The adminis-
tration expenses of this plan are assessed against all 
self-insurers. 
b. Experience Rating ~ 
The experience rating plan is based on a manual 
rate. The manual rate is the premium classification of a 
type of risk dependent upon the total experience of the 
risks comprising the classification. "The process of 
experience rating is in its essence not complex. The 
design is to produce an adjusted rate somewhere between 
the rate indicated by the risk's own experience and the 
rate indicated by the experience entering into the manual 
* 4.t P• 213 
** 1.:>, p.43 
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rate."* 
c. Adjusted Manual Rating Plan 
The adjusted manual rate is a premium found by 
adding to the manual premium a loss constant. This loss 
constant is a flat amount that is added to risks that are 
not experience rated to offset the fact that this class 
of risk produces normally a worse-than-average loss ex-
perience.** This results because the better risks have 
gene onto experience rating plans so that they may realize 
reduced premiums. Thus, the average for the remaining 
employers not on experience rating plans is poorer and 
must be so charged. 
d. Retrospective Plan 
The retrospective plan applies only to large 
risks and is optional. A basic premium is set up, and 
two rating standards are established: a minimum retro-
spective premium and a maximum retrospective premium. To 
the basic premium are added the actual losses of the risk. 
The basic premium plus the actual losses constitute the 
premium for the insured unless the result is less than 
the minimum retrospective premium or greater than the maxi-
mum retrospective premium. In either event, the minimum 
retrospective premium or the maximum retrospective preil'lium, 
* 3, p.555 
** 3, p.543 
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as the case may be, constitutes the insured's premium.* 
For example let us take a standard premium of 
$5,000. The basic would be 30 per cent of the standard 
premium. The minimum would be 75 per cent of the standard 
premium and the maximum would be 175 per cent of the standard 
premium.~~ Thus, actual losses are added to the $1,500 
basic premium; and if that total falls between $3,750 (the 
minimum premium) and $8,750 (the maximum premium), this 
amount is the premium paid. If it falls above $8,750 then 
$8,750 is the premium paid; and if it falls below $3,750 
then $3,750 is the premium paid. 
Direct costs, then, are amounts paid to insurance 
companies under various workmen's compensation plans or 
amounts paid directly to workers, hospitals and doctors 
under self-insurance. Direct costs are easily measured 
and show up readily in simple cost analysis. 
2. Indirect Costs 
Indirect costs are not controlled by law. They 
result from accidents, just as direct costs do. They are 
almost impossible to control to any marked degree. The 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company has listed ten catagories 
of indirect costs. They are as follows: 
1. Production time lost by an injured employee: 
* 3, p.576 
-ll* 15, p.5 
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Wages paid him for time .spent in getting first-aid; for 
time not worked that day if be does not return to work; 
for poor quality or less work when he does return to work. 
2. Time lost by the Executive & Supervisors~ 
In seeing that the injured employee is taken care of; in 
investigating the circumstances of the accident, in re-
arranging the production schedule; in making a report of 
the accident. 
3. Time Lost in Repairing, Replacing, Clearing 
Away, Rearranging, or Cleaning Up equipment or materia l 
that was damaged or disarranged by the accident. 
4. Production Time & Product Lost if a Machine 
is Shut Dovm or a Continuous Process Halted. 
5. Production Time and Product Lost by Other 
Employees near or at the scene of the accident. 
6. Cost of Overtime Wages to Make Up Lost Pro-
duct ion. 
7. Cost of Material Spoiled or Reprocessing of 
Product or Material Damaged by the accident or by a substi-
tute employee. 
8. Cost of Transferring or Hiring and Retraining 
or Training of Substitute Employee in temporarily accepting 
less quantity and quality from him. 
9. Cost of On-the-Job First-Aid. 
10. Miscellaneous or Unusual Costs such as public 
liability cla~ms, cost of renting replacement equipment, loss 
14 
of profit on contracts cancelled, etc.* 
At least one more can be added to this list. It 
is as follows: 
11. Cost to Employer under employee welfare 
and benefit systen1s exclusive of workmen's compensation. 
Although they must be sought ~ little more fer-
vently, indirect accident costs do exist and a dollar spent 
on indirect coat is just as bad as a dollar of direct 
accident cost. Both constitute a debit to the profit and 
loss statement. 
3. Relationship Between Direct and Indirect Costs 
The hidden or indirect cost of accidents, as 
compared with direct costs, has been found by research with 
national averages to be "four times as gre·at. ""~-* In some 
individual establishments, the indirect cost is six or 
eight times the direct cost- or even more."*-a Thus, it 
is apparent that direct accident coats measure only a part 
of the true costs of accidents. It is also apparent that 
accident costa assume many fold the significance than they 
formerly were thought to have on the profit picture, when 
indirect costs were not taken into account. Let us now 
look at an illustrative case to see an actual relationship 
between these two costs on a basis of dollars and cents. 
* 10, pp.2-3 
.: ... u,to 2 1 P• 50 
-iH!•* 10, p.2 
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Example:* Woodworking Shop. One year period. 
Lost-time injuries 7, first-aid cases 210. The out-
standing accident occurrence was a fire resulting from 
the spillage of a can of lacquer thinner. Three workers 
were burned, two being lost-time cases but neither 
serious. Most of the compensation paid was for a back 
strain suffered by the mechanic foreman who overlifted 
when moving a table saw. As a result of hi.s injury, 
machine maintenance was neglected with serious loss of 
production. 
Compensation paid 
Medical Expense 
Total direct cost 
Time Losses: 
Lost-time cases 
First-aid cases 
Other (estimated) 
Fire Damage 
Material spoilage 
Production loss 
Total indirect cost 
Ratio 6 to 1 
4. Other Costa 
$ 98.00 
145.00 
$243.00 
$ 23.00 
94.50 
50.00 
948.00 
11.00 
325.00 
$1,451.50 
Accidents have now been examined critically 
from the viewpoint of the employer. However, costs to 
the employee who is injured and to society have not 
been considered. 
a. Employee 
The employee suffers at least three losses 
that might be resolved into dollars and cents which are 
as follows: 
1. Cost of wages lost, not as great as the 
money loss of the employer, but which the employee is 
.:;. 1, PP• 25-26 
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leas able to pay. 
2. Cost of physical pain and mental anguish 
suffered. 
3. Goat of suffering of wife and dependents, 
both physical and mental, resultant from loss of income 
and loss of abilities or skills of the employee.* 
b. Society 
Society itself suffers genuine losses as the 
result of accidents. Three of these losses are: 
1. Cost of social agencies oftentimes re-
quired to partially support the families of injured 
workers. 
2. Cost of social agencies required to admin-
ister workmen's compensation cases and adjustments. 
3. Coat of the loss of the productivity of the 
worker who is incapacitated by the accident.~} 
These other costs have a place in the cost 
picture of accidents as far as the employer is concerned. 
Their effect is of a lesser degree than are 
direct and indirect costs, but they are of unquestionable 
significance. 
o. Relationship to Small Businesses 
In 1949 the National Safety Council made a survey 
* 1, p.28 
~*' l, p.28 
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of 3,500 plants of various sizes to determine the effect 
of the size of the business on the frequency and severity 
of accidents. Their results appear in Table 1. 
Table I 
INJURY RATES BY SIZE OF PLANT* 
Number of Employees 
Under 25 
25-49 
50-99 
100-199 
299-499 
500-999 
1000-up 
Rates 
Frequency 
25.9 
21.4 
17.4 
18.2 
12.3 
11.8 
9.2 
Severity 
2.41 
3.27 
1.14 
1.42 
.85 
.84 
.73 
Table I shows us that accident frequency and 
severity both decrease appreciably with the size of the 
firm. The rank order correlation between the number of 
employees and accident frequency is .965, between number 
of employees and accident severity .929, and between 
accident frequency and severity .965. 
Small-sized concerns, then, have the greatest 
number of accidents based on the comparable base of 
man-hours-worked. The concerns under 50 employees have 
about twice as many accidents as do those employing over 
1000 persons. Small concerns produce more accidents per 
man-hour-worked and also more accidents in total. 
"Roland P. Blake, Safety Engineer for the Bureau 
of Labor Standards, u. s. Dept. of Labor, analyzed the 
16, p.32 
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situation very well at the 27th Annual Massachusetts Safe-
ty Conference, when he said, 'At least 70 per cent of our 
injuries occur in establishments too small to be reached 
by the organized safety movement. It is the small firm 
having less than about 400 or 500 employees where the chief 
trouble lies. The boss is the production manager, the 
sales manager, the general supervisor -he doesn't think 
he has many accidents; he is too busy to realize how high 
a frequency he may have or what savings he could make if 
he reduced them. Unless he has a terrible record, his 
insurance carrier doesn't often call upon him to try to 
give him the facts as to accidents and help him do some-
thing to reduce them. He does not usually belong to any 
private safety organization. He can't afford a trained 
safety engineer even if he realized the need for one. So 
our accident tolls accumulate year after year.' " * 
In 1947 occupational injuries cost the nation 
$2,600,000,000 including wage loss, expense of medical 
care, overhead cost of compensation insurance, estimated 
money value of damaged equipment and materials, production 
slowdowns, and time lost by other workers not involved in 
the accidents. Small business, having 70 per cent of the 
accidents was saddled with a bill of $1,820,000,000. 
According to the latest available figures in 1947 from the 
u. s. Dept. of Commerce, 8.4 per cent of the nation's 
small business establishments were located in New England. 
The share of the small business owners of New England was 
$153,000,000. In 1947 there were 21,000 manufacturing 
establishments in New England employing less than 500 
persons. Each plant's share based on the figures available 
was about $7,300•** 
* 12, p.6 
WJo 12, pp.6-7 
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-D. Conclusions 
Chapter I has pointed out the costs of accidents 
and their relationship to small business. From the dis-
cussion it is apparent that accidents do have an appre-
ciable impact upon the profit picture of small companies 
whose size places them within the scope of this thesis. 
This cost, running into the thousands of dollars for 
individual businesses, can be considered as a necessary 
cost of accidents; but the accidents themselves !£!not 
necessary. They are a waste, pure and simple. _ Resultant 
costs of accidents have a serious effect on profits and, 
in some cases, can throw a company into the red. 
From any kind of a humanitarian or social out-
look, accidents are harmful. Accidents injure everyone 
and help no one. 
After exploring accidents and coming to the 
indisputable conclusion that they are undesirable, it 
would seem advisable to see how accident prevention tech-
niques can be applied to reduce these accidents. This will 
be the subject of the next chapter. 
20 
I I . The 11 How 11 of Accident Prevention 
A. Accidents 
The accident sequence and basic theory of acci-
dent prevention as analyzed by Heinrich will be quoted 
directly and is as follows: 
1~ preventable accident is one of five factors 
in a sequence that results in an injury. 
The injury is invariably caused by an accident 
and the accident in turn is always the result of the factor 
that immediately precedes it. 
In accident prevention the bull's eye of the 
target is in the middle of the sequence - an unsafe act 
of a person or a mechanical or physical hazard. 
The several factors in the accident occurrence 
series are given in chronological order in the following 
list: 
1. 
2. 
Accident Factors 
Ancestry and social environ-
ment. 
Fault of person 
Explanation of Factors 
Recklessness, stubborn-
ness, avariciousness, and 
other undesirable traits 
of character may be passed 
along through inheritance. 
Environment may develop 
undesirable traits of 
character or may inter-
fere with education. Both 
inheritance and environment 
cause faults of persons. 
Inherited or acquired 
faults of person; such as 
recklessness, violent 
temper, nervousness, ex-
citability, inconsider-
ateness, ignorance of 
safe practice, etc., con-
stitute proximate reasons 
for committing unsafe acts 
or for the existance of 
mechanical or physical haz-
ards. 
21 
3. Unsafe act and/or 
mechanical or physical 
hazard 
4. Accident 
5. Injury 
Unsa~e performance o~ 
persons, such as standing 
under suspended loads, 
starting machinery with-
out warning, horseplay, 
and removal of safeguards; 
and mechanical or physical 
hazards, such as unguarded 
gears, unguarded point o~ 
operation, absence of rail 
guards, and insu~ficient 
light, result directly 
in accidents. 
Events such as falls of 
persons, striking of 
persons by flying objects, 
etc., are typical accidents 
that cause injury. 
Fractures, lacerations, etc., 
are injuries that result 
directly from accidents. 
The occurrence of a preventable injury is the 
natural culmination of a series of events or circum-
stances, which invariably occur in a fixed and logical 
order. One is dependent on another and one follows because 
of another, thus constituting a sequence that may be com-
pared with a row of dominoes placed on end and in such 
alignment in relation to one another that the fall of the 
first domino precipitates the fall of the entire row. An 
accident is merely one factor in the sequence. 
If this series is interrupted by the elimination 
of even one of the several ~actors that comprise it, the 
injury cannot possibly occur. 
If one single ~actor of the entire sequence is to 
be selected as the most important, it would undoubtedly be 
the one indicated by the unsafe act of the person or the 
existing mechanical hazard. No preventable accident has 
ever occurred or ever will occur without the existence of 
one or both of these circumstances."* 
A de~inition published by the Liberty Mutual 
* 2, pp.ll-15 
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Insurance Co. defines an accident broadly and delves into 
the causal relationship. This definition states that, 
"Every accident has two parts: a cause and a result:: 
THE CAUSE: The cause is usually set in motion 
when someone (a) does something he should not have 
done (mistake or wrong method) or (b) fails to do some-
thing he should have done {failure to act or to use best 
methods). 
In any given accident the cause may be one or 
more unsafe acts or omissions. Sometimes an accident 
follows a combination of causes, for example; injury or 
damage may result from unsafe mechanical conditions, plus 
unsafe environments or working conditions, plus unsafe 
methods or human failure. All may appear as causes because 
one or more people sometime, somewhere, used an improper 
method or failed to do what should have been done. 
THE RESULT: The result of an unsafe act or 
omission may be (a) personal injury or death of one or 
more persons, (b) damage to material, equipment, machines, 
or other property, (c) injury and damage, or (d) an 
interruption or stoppage of work without injury or damage. 
This result may follow immediately after the 
cause, or it may happen later as a delayed action or re-
action."* 
B. Accident Prevention 
Thus we see that an accident is not a singae 
happening, but it is one factor in a string of causal 
relationships. Accident prevention aims at eliminating 
the causes thereby making future accidents impossible. 
The chief eliminator of accident causes is good 
supervision. Every type of production problem eventually 
is the responsibility and comes under the scope of line 
•* 9, p.3 
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supervisors. Safety is no exception. Good supervision 
primarily concerned with getting out production in the 
most efficient manner will automatically enter the field 
of accident prevention with such regular methods as com-
plete job instruction, elimination of horseplay, good 
housekeeping , proper care of tools and machinery, proper 
lifting habits, and countless others. A safe working en-
, 
vironment will generally be achieved by the achievement 
of efficient production based on good supervision. "Acci-
dent Prevention is a part of production, not apart from."# · 
Prevention methods fall into two similar types: 
accident investigation and hazard hunting. The goal of each 
is to eliminate accident causes, but the difference is in 
the manner in which the causes are discovered. 
1. Hazard Hunting 
Hazard hunting involves searching out and eli-
minating the causes of accidents before they occur. Past 
experience in investigation of accidents has proven that 
certain condit i ons, b~ they static or operational, are 
conducive to the occurrence of accidents. Knowledge, 
recognition, and elimination of these conditions typifies 
t his method of accident prevention. Hazard hunting can 
be broken down further into plant inspection and job or 
method analysis. 
# Supervisors' Safety Conference, Conf. #1, Conclusion 14, 
Appendix p.ll5 
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Plant inspection is, just as its name suggests, 
the touring of a plant by experienced safety personnel 
giving complete attention to finding of possible accident 
causes. When possible causes are found, notation is 
made of them. Upon completion of the inspection, a state-
ment of the hazard and recommendations of corrective action 
are submitted to the proper executive authorities. These 
executives will make final judgment as to whether the 
proposed correction will be initiated. This decision is 
made by consideration of the cost of 'the corrective action 
as opposed to the potential, both frequency and severity, 
of the hazard. 
a. Plant Inspection 
Plant inspection may be made at infrequent time 
intervals by government inspectors, insurance safety 
engineers, or by consultants brought in by the management. 
This type is considered as one-call inspections and is 
used to appraise safety conditions and performance rather 
than to figure out and eliminate specific hazards. 
The continuous type of inspection activity is 
set up and carried on by the management. It is a system-
atic procedure that should be de veloped to make sure that 
everything of importance, accident-wise, is inspected at 
proper time intervals. The inspector should be both 
orderly and thorough. Written reports of what has been 
inspected, when it was inspected, what hazards were found, 
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what recommendations were made, and to whom they were 
submitted should be made and kept on permanent file by 
the inspection team.* 
b. Job Safety Analysis 
Joq safety analysis or methods safety analysis 
techniques are quite similar to those used in Time and 
Motion Study. The operation or job is broken down into 
its elementary steps and each step is critically examined 
with regard to existing or possible hazards. It is an 
inspection technique applied in detail. As in plant in-
spection, complete records of the activities of the people 
doing the analysis should be kept on permanent file. 
It has been substantiated by practical experience 
that the safe way and the most efficient way is generally 
one and the same. Thus, methods safety analysis will not 
only eliminate hazards, thereby cutting down accident~, but 
will also improve production efficiency. 
2. Accident Investigation 
Accident investigation concerns itself with 
analyzing the causes of accidents after the accidents have 
occurred. The facts of identification and the factors of 
causation are diligently gathered. The causative factor or 
factors are then isolated -and an immediate remedy applied. 
This immediate remedy will eliminate the particular cause 
or causes for the one particular accident studied. This 
* 1, pp. 79-95 
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is only the first function of accident investigation. 
The second function is to apply the afore-
mentioned technique of inspection and see if the same or 
similar hazard or hazards exist at other places in the 
plant. These then should also be eliminated. 
The third function of accident investigation 
is that of evaluation and analysis of the more general 
accident prevention problem through analysis of total 
figures from many accidents. If certain accident types 
show many repetitions such as slips onto the f~oor, then 
more thorough attention should, naturally, be given to 
this area. Perhaps more attention should be given to floor 
surfaces or special types of shoes should be worn, or 
perhaps employees just need to be more careful of how they 
walk, in which case an education or instruction program 
is needed. 
In these three ways accident investigation and 
analysis gives opportunity (1) for local prevention at 
the place of each accident, (2) for more general preven-
tion against the same or similar type of accident through-
out the plant, and (3) for management to ascertain what 
accident · types are the most common or severe in the plant 
so that the proper concentration of effort can be used in 
this area. 
3. Remedies 
After accident causes have been ascertained a 
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remedy must be applied. The four basic remedies are:. 
"1. Eng ineering revision - including the guard-
ing of machines and tools, isolation of hazards, revision 
of procedures and processes, illumination, ventilation, 
color and color contrast, provision of personal protective 
devices, substitution of safer tools, etc., replacement 
and repair, and a wide variety of similar steps of a 
mechanical or physical nature. 
2. Instruction, persuasion, and appeal - in-
cluding training as well as instruction and reinstruction, 
persuasion and appeal through the motivating characteris-
tics of persons, visual as well as oral appro~ches, safety 
education, and safety organization with all of its man y 
activities. 
3. Personnel adjustment - including selection 
and placement with regard to the requirements of the job 
and the physical and mental suitability of the worker, 
medical treatment, and advice. 
4. Discipline - including mild admonishment, 
expression of disappointment, fair insistence, statement 
of past record, transfer to other work , and penalties."* 
The remedies are listed in the pr eferred order 
of the i r attempted application. Engineering revision if 
it works is the most sure rne~bdd. It must be acceptable 
on both a human and a cost basis. Instruction, persuasion 
and appeal constitute educational values which represent 
a very lucrative field for accident prevention efforts. 
Personnel adjustment is tied in with job qualifications 
and is usually a standard part of a modern employment 
procedure. It does have a special adaptation to safety. 
Discipline should. be used only as a last resort. The use 
of d~scipline to any marked degree reflects poorly on the 
* 2, p.l49 
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quality of supervision. 
Remedies should not be applied independently. 
They should be thought of as being interdependent. The 
introduction of a new safety device cannot be made with-
out acceptance by the employees who are constantly going 
to be using it. This acceptance is dependent upon the 
general relationship that exists between management and 
the employees and also upon the success of the educational 
program as carried on by management. A good illustration 
of this particular point will be found in the case entitled, 
Safety In A Punch Press Department* from Pigors and Meyers, 
Personnel Administration. In the Press Dept. there had 
been a serious accident resulting in the loss of two fingers 
of a male machine operator. The accident took place on a 
drop hammer used to form valve plates. The operator had 
been using his fingers instead of tweezers to insert 
blanks between the dies. The hammer repeated and the 
operator's hand was cr.ushed between the dies. 
There was a safety rule to the effect that 
tweezers were to be used in placing and removing the 
material from all punch presses and drop haL~ers, but it 
was the practi·ce of the employees to disregard this rule 
and use their hands. This represented a major problem 
of poor supervision that was not tackled by management. 
* 5, pp.510-521 
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Instead, they purchased a Preston Positive Safety Device 
which could be used on either machine. This device was 
so rigged that when the hammer was tripped the hands of 
the operator were automatically pulled out of the danger 
zone. 
Without any previous consultation with the 
operators or the union, the Preston Device was installed. 
The workers refused to operate the machine with this de-
vice. They were backed up wholeheartedly by their union 
representative. Eventually this device had to be discarded. 
A similar situation had occurred previously with sweep 
guards. 
Shortly after this futile attempt by manage-
ment to solve their problem by an unacceptable engineering 
revision, a second accident took place. This one was on 
a punch press with a two-handed trip. The female operator 
involved had been holding down the left hand trip with her 
elbow and feeding the machine with her left hand without 
tweezers. Evidently she had hit the right hand trip with 
her right elbow while still holding down the left hand 
trip with her left elbow. Her hand was crushed between the 
dies requiring the amputation of her left thumb and left 
index finger. 
In this case the management attempted to use only 
one remedy which was not acceptable by the employees. The 
basic problem which was never attacked was one of poor 
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supervision. This should have been the point of attack. 
Management tried another remedy which might have been 
successful. They were stymied by their poor approach in 
trying to get the device accepted. 
The remedy or remedies to be applied should be 
selected only after a thorough analysis of the causative 
factors. By proper judgment the most suitable remedy or 
grouping of remedies can be applied to achieve the maxi-
mum results for the money and effort expended. This 
judgment is a product of experience plus good common 
sense. 
When a remedy has been applied and has failed to 
bring adequate results, then sub-eauses must be investigated. 
Sub-causes are usually associated with unsafe personal 
actions rather than unsafe mechanical conditions. For 
instance, in a company eye injuries have been found by 
analysis to be alarmingly frequent in the grinding depart-
ment. The direct cause of this is that goggles are not worn 
by the employees. Although goggles are provided by the 
company and t here is a safety rule that goggles shall be 
worn while performing grinding operations, the rule is 
constantly disobeyed, resulting in eye injuries from fly-
ing metal sparks. Discipline is surely not the answer yet, 
because the investigation has been incomplete. The why 
question should be asked again. Why don't employees use 
the goggles as provided? The goggles are uncomfortable 
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to wear would most likely be the simple answer. This 
constitutes the sub-cause; and since our remedies can be 
applied to the sub-cause as well as to the direct or pri-
mary cause, we can precede to apply a new remedy on solid 
ground. The discovery of sub-causes does not mean that 
a successful remedy can be applied, but it does open a new 
field for investigation. 
c. Measurement 
The most common yardsticks of accident measure-
ment are the frequency rate and the severity rate. Both 
measure only those accidents which result in lost time or 
absence from work by the injured employee. 
The accident frequency rate is expressed as 
the number of disabling or lost-time accidents times one 
million divided by the number of man-hours worked for the 
group measured. 
The formula is: 
Accident Frequency Rate = 
number of lost-time accidents 
X 1,000,000 
number of man-hours worked 
The accident severity rate is expressed as the 
number of days lost due to all disabling accidents times 
one thousand divided by the number of man-hours worked for 
the group measured. 
The formula is: 
Accident Severity Rate = 
number of days lost x 1,000 
number of man hours worked 
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The constants of 1,000,000 in the accident fre~ 
quency rate and 1,000 in the accident severity rate are 
used so that the resulting rates will be in a digital 
range easily dealt with. In Table I, page 18, we see that 
frequency varied from 9.2 to 25.9 and severity from .73 
to 3.27. These figures are much more readily dealt with 
and understood than would be .000025 or .00073 which 
would be the results if the constants were not used. 
Since some disabilities, such as loss of limb, 
cannot be directly expressed as days lost, time changes 
must be made for these accidents in order to compute the 
accident severity rate. These charges are customarily 
made from the American Standard Scale which appears below: 
American Standard Scale of Time Charges* 
Disablement 
Death 
Permanent total disability 
Arm - at or above elbow 
Arm - below elbow 
Hand 
Thumb 
Any one finger 
Two fingers - same hand 
Three fingers - same hand 
Four fingers - same band 
Thumb and one finger - same hand 
Thumb and two fingers - same hand 
Thumb and three fingers - same hand 
Thumb and four fingers - same hand 
Leg, at or above knee 
Leg - be low knee 
Foot 
Great toe or any two or more toes - same foot 
* 1 , p.32 
Time Charge 
6,000 days 
6,000 
4,500 
3,600 
3,000 
600 
300 
750 
1, 200 
1,800 
1,200 
1,500 
2,000 
2,400 
4,500 
3,000 
2,400 
300 
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Two great toes 
One eye - loss of sight 
Both eyes - loss of sight 
One ear - loss of hearing 
Two ears - loss of hearing 
600 
1,800 
6,000 
600 
3,000 
These accident rates are valuable because they 
measure the accident experience of a work unit. They 
serve both as a basis of comparison between diffirent work 
groups and as a basis of comparison for a single work group 
between different time periods. The rates have transposed 
the accident experience to a comparable basis in that the 
rates are not dependent upon the size of the work group. 
The component factors usually are easy to gather and the 
computation is simple. 
Accident frequency and severity rates are 
merely measures of the results of accidents. The proper 
relationship between the accident, its cause, and its 
result should be clearly understood. Schaefer describes 
this relationship well when he says, "A study of results 
merely makes one aware of the number and severity of acci-
dents; a study of the causes reveals the underlying factors 
contributing to the accidents and to the possibility of 
similar situations in the future."* 
Accident frequency is the only significant measure-
ment of the success of an accident program. Accident fre-
quency represents the number of accidents which have oc-
curred. Accident severity only measures the luck factor. 
* 6, pp.73-74 
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It is contingent upon the frequency since lost-time can 
only result from lost-time accidents which show up in the 
frequency rate. 
For most all contests, the accident frequency 
rate is used as the measure of safety since it more justly 
represents the accident prevention record. 
Another accident frequency rate is sometimes 
computed. This is based on minor-injury accidents rather 
than lost-time accidents. The value of this rate is entire-
ly dependent upon the accuracy of the reporting and the 
recording of the accidents as they occur. 
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III. Organization for Safety 
A. Organization Types 
"Organization constitutes the vehicle - the 
systematic precedure - by means of which interest is 
created and maintained and safety activities are corre-
lated and directed."* 
These words state clearly that organization is 
not static but kenetic. It is constantly functioning to 
achieve its goals. The goals of safety organization are to 
reduce the accident frequency and severity through the 
two media of action and interest. The two go hand in hand 
and an organizational system. where one is lacking will be 
found to be deficient. 
Any type of safety organization in order to be 
efficient must have the support, sanction and approval of 
top management and the responsibility for safety must be 
centralized and rest with the executive personnel.** 
There are three common types of organizational 
structures to carry out the objectives of a safety program. 
They are: those where the complete safety work is carried 
on by the line executives, those where the safety work is 
carried on by a special safety director reporting to a line 
executive, and those where the safety work is carried on by 
special committees set up for this purpose. 
1. Line Organization 
In this type of safety organization the safety 
* 2, p.71 
* * l, p.265 
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work is done by line executives as a part of their regular 
duties. Safety is not separated from the other functions 
of the executives. The safety work is susceptible to 
negligence by the executive if he is overburdened and poor 
safety experience makes no pressing demands upon him. The 
chief advantage is that the responsibility is centralized 
in the line. Each department head is responsible for 
safety in his department and can be held accountable for it. 
Line organization is most commonly found in the 
smaller businesses where management cannot obtain the 
services of a safety director due to financial limitations 
and have deemed it neither wise nor necessary to use the 
committee type of organization. Accident prevention tech-
niques are not exceptionally difficult to administer, but 
just as other techniques require genuine effort and skill, 
so do safety techniques. Where the line executive is tied 
U])! in other matters, he may well feel that he can allow less 
time and effort to safety without jeopardizing the per-
formance of the safety program. This belief is a proven 
fallacy . This negligence is much less likely to happen 
if the safety staff functions are handled by a full-time 
safety director or by a committee organization that func-
tions on a continuous and permanent basis. Safety commit-
tees and full-time safety directors represent specialization 
that is not usually found in the line type of safety organi-
zation. 
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Although safety directors and committees handle 
a great deal of the safety work and even take on some line 
duties in the area of safety, line supervision still must 
play the major role in any safety program. Only the fore-
man knows his men. Only the foreman knows the particular 
hazards in his department. Only the foreman can take con-
tinued corrective action on unsafe acts and/or conditions 
as a part of his daily work. Line supervision is the key 
to a good safety program. Safety directors and safety 
committees are aids or helps to line supervisors. They are 
a definite asset to a safety program, but without foreman 
support they will surely be inadequate. 
2. Safety Director 
This ~ype of organization is most common in the 
larger firms where continued maintenance of low accident 
costs wall warrants the full-time efforts of a man or even 
a department on safety work. The safety director is a 
specialist who operates in a staff capacity reporting to 
his superior, a line executive. His job is safety; his 
methods, various. 
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He operates through the line supervisors to apply 
the accident preveption methods and techniques, and to instill 
into the entire work force at all levels, a spirit of safety 
mindfulness and a genuine interest in the safety program. 
He is a leader, yet, he can give no direct orders except 
to his own subordinates. He handles the safety program for 
the entire company, but is dependent upon others to make it 
function properly. His major activities are of a promo-
tional and educationa.l nature. The safety function in 
day-to-day operations is still in the hands of the foreman. 
The safety director is a co-ordinator, a promoter and an 
educator. In this capacity he serves line supervision. 
In many companies the safety director works in 
conjunction with safety committees. This has the advantage 
of having leadership from a specialist and active participa-
tion of others in the company. 
3. Committees 
This type of organization allows for participa-
tion in the safety activities by many more persons. The 
primary advantages of safety committees are that the judg-
ment of the group is more likely to be better than the judg-
ment of a single person and that participation seeds both 
interest and a desire for proper action. 
Committee meetings consume the time of many persons 
and represent a definite outlay of funds. Care must be taken 
that this does not go to waste. All too often safety commit-
tees submit good recommendations to executives that eventually 
find their w~y into the wastebasket. If at all possible, an 
executive who has authority to initiate recommendations should 
head up the committee. There is nothing more detrimental to 
a committee member's morale than to see his efforts ignored, 
and there is nothing more satisfying to this same committee 
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member than to see his efforts result in sound corrective 
action with favorable results upon accident frequency. 
Safety committees can be set up in many ways. 
The membership can all come from one level of organization 
such as the Foremen's Safety Committee or they can include 
all levels of organization from top management to the 
workers themselves. There may be one committee or several 
where each are set up to handle different jobs. Armstrong 
lists four types of committees: the main or governing 
committee, the working man's committee, technical commit-
tees and special purpose committees.* 
Where more than one committee operates, there 
should be good liaison and proper functional relationship 
between them. One committee should not be kept in the dark 
as to what the other committees are doing, but should have 
the benefit of the efforts and conclusions of these other 
committees • . Thus, if a system of committees is used, their 
activities just be integrated so that the goal ean be 
reached wit:l the least amount of overlap between committees. 
T± responsibility for the committee's operation 
should be ce, tralized in one person, presumably the executive 
who is to he d up the committee. Each committee member is in 
a sense res~nsible for the safety activity of the committee, 
but as expre sed so well by Pigors and Meyers, "As a practical 
fact, dy's business turns out to be nobody 1 s business 
i)$. 1, p.273 
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unless responsibility is formally centered in one person • .,.;., 
Safety committees should work with line supervisors 
who carry out the policies and recommendations of the commit-
tee. Foremen membership in the committee has definite 
advantages from both an educational and an administrative 
standpoint. Many companies follow this policy and it is 
generally concluded to be beneficial. 
B. Insurance Companies 
Insurance companies have a great interest in the 
safety activities of concerns who have workmen's compensa-
tion insurance coverage with them. As we have seen in 
Chapter I, the premium paid to the insurance company by any 
concern is dependent either upon the experience of the 
classification of which the concern is a part, or upon the 
experience of the concern itself, dependent upon the type of 
insurance plan under which they are operating. If accidents 
and resu~ant costs can be reduced, the insurance companies 
will have to pay smaller claims with resultant higher profits. 
Under the adjusted manual rating plan the premium 
is not dependent upon the experience of the individual con-
cern, but upon the experience of a whole classification. 
Thus, if a concern is insured and their experience is better 
than the average of the whole classification, there will 
result a profit for the insurance company. This is so since 
the premium, determined from the average of the classifica-
~~- 5, p.323 
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tion, will be more than the sum of the losses and the over-
head incurred by the insurance company. 
Under the experience rating plan, a reduction in 
accidents for a concern below the average of its classifica-
tion will result in a reduction in the premium of the insured 
concern and will also result in a profit for the insurance 
company. This is so because the difference between the 
manual premium and the total of compensation claims, medi-
cal expenses and insurance overhead is shared between the 
insurance company and the insured concern. 
Under the retrospective plan, the insurance company 
will earn a profit if the experience of the insured is kept 
below the 75 per cent of standard premium level since the 
insured must pay a minimum of 75 per cent of the standard 
premium. Thus, the profit of the insurance company is the 
difference between the experience premium of the individual 
concern, if it is below the 75 per cent of standard level, 
and the 75 per cent of standard premium. 
In all three cases it is disadvantageous to the 
insurance company for any insured's experience to be worse 
than the average for the classification. In the first two 
oases, experience worse than average will result in direct 
losses and in the third case an experience worse than 175 
per cent of the standard premium will result in a direct loss. 
Insurance companies attempt to reduce the accident 
experience rates of their insureds, since any reduction will 
result either in smaller losses or in higher profits on indi-
vidual risks. This reduction constitutes an addition to 
profit to the insurance carrier. Strictly from a business 
point of view, it pays insurance companies to expend their 
time and effort to reduce the number of accidents incurred 
by their insureds. 
Most insurance companies that handle the workmen's 
compensa tion line have as a permanent part of their organiza-
tions, engineering departments. These engineering depart-
ments are made up of service or safety engineers whose job 
it is to reduce the frequencey and severity of accidents of 
the concerns insured by their company. Each engineer acts 
in a staff or advisory capacity to several concerns which he 
services. Properly trained safety engineers acting in this 
capacity can be a real help to any company. 
Probably the most important task the insurance 
company safety engineer performs is educating the top 
management of smaller companies· as to the importance of 
safety from a cost basis and as to the methods and techni-
ques of accide11t prevention. The management of many smaller 
companies, those employing under 500 persons, either do not 
realize the true costs of acc i dents and they do little about 
them or, even if they do realize the costs, don't know what 
to do about them. 
Larger companies usually handle their own safety 
programs although the safety engineer of the insurance 
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company lends his support to the program. In some smaller 
concerns, where the executives who should be handling the 
safety program are overloaded yet still conscious of the need 
of a safety program, the program may be directed by the 
insurance safety engineer with the backing and support of 
the top management. In most smaller concerns the safety 
engineer guides management who carries on its own safety 
activities. In this manner safety becomes a permanent, 
continuous activity and still uses the skill and experience 
of a professional safety man. 
Since the activities of insurance companies are 
based on costs, very small concerns, those employing less 
than 50 persons, do not get as much attention from this 
source as do larger small concerns, especially if their 
records are not exceptionally poor. 
c. Other Aids 
There are other outside organizational aids to the 
safety organization of any concern. The most notable of 
these is the National Safety Council. The division in this 
state is known as the Massachusetts Safety Council. This is 
primarily an educational source for managements working in 
conjunction with other outside agencies, although the 
Massachusetts Safety Council does sponsor safety contests 
which create interest among the various competing concerns. 
The 1953 Annual Massachusetts Industrial Safety 
Contest classified its contestants by groups according to 
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the relative hazards of their work. Any company employing 
15 or more persons was eligible to enter. The winner of each 
group was determined by frequency alone, and the winners of 
each group were entered in the nation-wide contest sponsored 
by The National Safety Council.~ 
The state is another aid to managements in the field 
of safety. Their work in investigation and inspection is 
limited, but the Department of Labor and Industries publishes 
many phamphlets explaining safety techniq1es and regulations 
in regard to various types of activities. The state also 
keeps total accident figures for the state which are later 
used as a basis of analysis and comparison. 
D. Conclusions 
No one type of safety organization can be said to 
be better in all cases than any other type. If the basic 
requirements of organization are met, each type can operate 
effectively and perform the functions that have been assigned 
to it. Each concern has its choice of the type of internal 
organization which it wants. The selection is dependent 
upon many factors, and the type chosen should be adaptable 
to the situation as it exists. Each company, no matter what 
its size, what its operations, or what its competitive posi-
tion, has its own particular situation and should adapt its 
safety organization to this situation. 
Some of the external organizational aids are the 
* 8 
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insurance companies' safety engineers, the National Safety 
Council and government departments and agencies. These 
should not be depended upon heavily, but represent a real 
contribution to the safety program. 
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· IV. Greater Boston Firms 
A. Scope 
On December 15, 1953, a questionnaire was sent 
out to 203 concerns in the Greater Boston area. The company 
names were taken from the Directory of Massachusetts Manu-
facturers published by the Massachusetts Development and 
Industrial Commission in 1951.~~ This directory classified 
the companies by cities and by size of establishment. This 
was the latest directory that was available to the author at 
the time the survey was made. 
Answers to questions were solicited from companies 
which, at the time of the survey, employed between 100 and 
500 persons. This resulted in some companies having over 
500 and others under 100 employees since there was a two-year 
time interval between the publication of the directory and 
the solicitation of information by this writer. Of 120 · 
returns, 7 companies employed under 100 persons; 86 employed 
between 100 and 500 persons; 18 employed over 500 persons; 
and 9 mi s cellaneous returns were received whi ch were of no 
value . 
The survey solicited information from companies 
of the des i red size in the following cities: 
* 14, pp.l-58 
Arlington 
Boston 
Brookline 
Cambridge 
Chelsea 
Dedham 
Everett 
Malden 
Medford 
Melrose 
Needham 
Newton 
~uincy 
Revere 
Somerville 
Stoneham 
Waltham 
Watertown 
Woburn 
A listing of the reporting companies will be 
found in the Appendix starting on page 108. 
Since the scope of this thesis includes only 
those companies employing between 100 and 500 persons, and 
since it was realized that some of the companies surveyed 
would either have more or less than this number, these 
companies were classified as ineligible and were requested 
not to bother to fill out any of the questionnaire beyond 
question number one. Total returns, both usable and non-
usable, n~wer 120 which represents a 58.3 per cent reply. 
The usable returns which numbered 86 represent a 41.7 per 
cent reply. Neither of these percentages can be thought of 
as being the true percentage of return. The correct figure 
should lie somewhere between them. This is so since it can 
be expected that a larger percentage of returns will come 
from companies who are outside the scope of the survey (who 
indicated so by a simple check mark on the questionnaire) 
than from those who must fill out the entire questionnaire. 
It is not known how many companies solicited in the survey 
were eligible to answer. If we assume that 100 per cent 
of the ineligible companies (those employing under 100 or 
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over 500 persons) made returns, which is highly improbable, 
then the total of the eligible companies would be reduced 
by 25. Among the 9 returns classified as miscellaneous was 
one company who had liquidated and one company that could 
not be located and whose questionnaire was returned unopened. 
These two companies must also be classified as ineligible, 
and brings the smallest possible total of ineligible 
companies up to 27 and the largest possible eligible total 
down to 176. Using these figures we get a percentage of 
return of 48.9 per cent based on eligible companies. 
Since it is not likely that 100 per cent of the 
ineligible companies made returns, the total number of 
eligible companies would be less than 176 and the percentage 
of return would be higher than 48.9 per cent. How much 
higher the return percentage will be cannot be ascertained, 
but a conservative estimate will probably move up over the 
50 per cent level. 
A 50 per cent reply is excellent for any ques-
tionnaire sent out at random to various business enterprises. 
The return is especially significant because it was directed 
to smaller companies who could well be expected not to 
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respond as well as larger companies since the larger companies 
are generally more public-relations minded, and more in-
clined to answer questionnaires of this sort. It clearly 
indicates that smaller companies in the Boston Area are 
interested enough in their safety work to take the time to 
fill out a questionnaire, which, to some extent, forces them 
critically to analyze their own safety program. It also in-
dicates to some degree that these same firms are interested 
in furtJ1ering study in this field of safety, and that they 
are more than willing to co-operate with the educational 
institutions and their students in this area. 
The excellent percentage of returns is to some 
small degree indicative that the small companies in the 
Greater Boston Area at least recognize the problem of acci-
dent prevention and what it means to them. How they are able 
to combat accidents is still another question, but the indi-
cation is that the recognition and interest is there, and 
that is certainly the first step. 
Before progressing further it may be well to know 
what was classified under miscellaneous returns. Besides 
the two companies already discussed, two more stated that 
50 
they had no safety program, two stated - one in a 90 word 
letter - that they did not have sufficient time to fill out 
the questionnaire, and three others returned the questionnaire 
perfectly blank with no explanation. 
A copy of the letter and questionnaire will be 
found in the Appendix on page 111 and page 11.2. 
The firms surveyed were classified in two groups: 
those employing between 100 and 250 persons and those em-
ploying between 250 ·and 500 persons. They will be referred 
to as Class A and Class B, respectively, in further dis-
cuss ions. 
B. Organization 
We have stated that there are three basic types 
of organizational structures with many offshoots and hybrids 
of these types. For statistical purposes the companies sur-
veyed were placed in one of the three basic catagories rather 
than hybrids. The results of the questionnaire dealing ·with 
types of safety organizational structures will be found in 
Table II. 
Table II 
TYPES OF' ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE 
Class A Class B Totals 
~ No. tf No. ! No. 2f 
Line organization 22 48.9 10 24.4 32 37.2 
Safety director 0 0 2 4.9 2 2.3 
Safety committees 23 51.1 29 70.7 52 60.5 
Totals 45 100.0 41 100.0 86 100.0 
A study of this table clearly shows that safety 
organizations in the company-size studied do not employ 
full-time safety directors to run their safety programs. Out 
of 86 firms reporting, only two had full-time safety directors. 
The most prominent type of organization was found to be the 
safety committee type which represent 60.5 per cent of the 
total of both classes. The larger companies, Class B, used 
safety committees more extensively than did the smaller com-
panies. As the use of safety committees increased with the 
size of the company, there was a correspondingly direct de-
crease in the use of purely line organization, since there was 
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very little effect felt from the use of safety directors. 
The use of line organization decreased from Class A to 
Class B by 24.5 per cent while the increase of the safety 
committee type of organization increased by 19.6 per cent. 
These figures are comparable and show the direct relationship. 
If the ·survey had included larger firms employing more than 
500 employees, then the use of safety director type of organi-
zation would probably be more prominent 
Table II is indicative of the fact that small 
companies are truly the troublesome area; it points out that 
the specialization, more inherent with the full-time safety 
director type of organization, is lacking in this area. 
Safety committees are ineffective if they do not 
operate continually and permanently. Safety is a function 
that must be carried on every d~:W • No safety program can 
operate properly on Mond~·y, Wednesday and Friday, and not on 
Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, and still be effective. Some 
indication of the effectiveness of a safety program handled 
by safety comrnittees can be ascertained from the frequency of 
their meetings. This is not the determinant factor because 
if the interest and the purpose of the meetings are not taken 
into the shop and put into practice, then the safety program 
will be ineffective. Table III shows that the most common 
frequency of safety committee meetings is monthly, which 
represents 69.1 per cent of the frequency of both classes. 
52 
Irregular meetings ranked second at 17.4 per cent. Class B 
leads Class A in that the time interval between committee 
meetings is shorter. Class B has a higher percentage of 
meetings on a weekly, semi-monthly and monthly basis, and a 
lower percentage of irregular meetings. 
If committees in Class B meet more regularly than 
those in Class A, it can be expected that they will be some-
what more effective. This cannot be proven. The best attempt 
would be to compare the accident frequency rates of those 
companies using the committee type of organization and having 
regular safety meetings against those companies, using the 
committee type of organization but not having regular safety 
meetings. This would not be entirely conclusive because of 
other factors involved which would affect the frequency such 
as qualify of supervision, hazards inherent in the occupation, 
the degree of backing given the safety program by top manage-
ment and various others. No comparison of the type suggested 
will be made in this thesis since many companies do not keep 
records of their accident frequency rates, and it would be 
very difficult to obtain the records of those that did. 
Who attends safety meetings is important. In order 
to effect the recommendations of a committee it should be 
headed up by executives from the higher levels of management. 
Reference will now be made to Table IV. In Class A, 22.8 
per cent of the committees had representatives from top manage-
ment, and 40.9 per cent had representatives from middle manage-
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ment . Class B companies had top management representa t ion i n 
69.0 per cent of its committees, and 41.4 per cent had repre-
sentation from middle management. Thus, the larger companies 
have a better representation from higher management than do 
small companies. This means tha t companies in Class B have a 
better chan ce of applying and implementing the work of the 
conm1ittee since they get ruore support and backing fro~ higher 
management. 
TABLE III 
FREQUENCY OF SAFETY COMMITTEE M.EETINGS 
Frequency 
Weekly 
Semi-monthly 
Monthly 
Bi-monthly 
Semi-annually 
Annually 
Irregularly 
Totals 
Class A 
No. ~ 
1 4.3 
1 4.3 
15 65.3 
6 26.1 
23 100.0 
TABLE IV 
MEMBERSHIP OF SAFETY 
Class A 
MembershiE No . ~ 
Employees 12 54.5 
First-line super-
visors 15 68.2 
Top management 5 22.8 
Middle management 9 40.9 
Insurance company 
representative 11 50.0 
Companies report-
ing 22 100.0 
Class B 
No. if 
2 6.9 
2 6.9 
21 72.8 
1 3.4 
3 10.0 
29 100.0 
COMMITTEES 
Class B 
No. ! 
16 55.0 
27 93.0 
20 69.0 
12 41.4 
3 10.3 
29 100.0 
Totals 
No. ~ 
3 5.8 
3 5.8 
36 69.1 
1 1.9 
9 17.4 
52 100 .0 
Totals 
No. 1f 
28 55.0 
42 82 . 2 
25 49 . 0 
21 41 . 2 
14 27.5 
51 100.0 
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Another important point is brought out by Table IV. 
This is the representation in conm1ittee meetings by the in-
surance carrier's safety engineer. He attended the meetings 
of 50.0 per cent of Class A companies and only 10.3 per cent 
of Class B companies. This means that companies in Class B 
seemingly take more initiative and work more independently on 
their safety functions than do those in Class A. Although it 
cannot be positively proven, the writer would strongly suspect 
that the work and efforts of the insurance carrier's safety 
engineers constituted one of the reasons why safety committees 
were set up in Class A firms. It is also suspected that these 
same service engineers head up many of these safety committees. 
The Engineering Department of the Employer's Liability Assurance 
Corp., Ltd., a workmen's compensation insurer, has been instru-
mental in strengthening the organizations and safety programs 
of many of its assureds. In the smaller companies where the 
specialized talent is lacking, the safety engineers of 
Employer's Liability serve as leaders in the .committee meetings 
until the proper methods and techniques have been acquired by 
the individual managements. This is common practice for in-
surance carriers. 
The third significant point derived from Table IV 
has to do with foremen participation in safety committees. 
The foreman, being the key man in industry between management 
and the employees, has an important part in the safety program. 
Foremen or first-line supervisors participation was highest for 
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both classes, but Class B leads Class A in this field, having 
a 93.0 per cent participation against 68.2 per cent partici-
pation. This is just one more indication that Class B has a 
more extensive organization for safety than Class A. 
TABLE V 
SIZE OF SAFETY COMMITTEES 
Class A Class B Totals 
No. of Members No. ! No. ~ No. 1! 
1-5 11 50.0 6 21.5 17 34.0 
6-10 8 36.4 9 32.1 17 34.0 
11-15 3 13.6 6 21.5 9 18.0 
16-20 2 7.1 2 4.0 
20-25 3 10.7 3 6.0 
25-up ·- a 7.1 2 4.0 
Totals 22 100.0 28 100.0 50 100.0 
The final inquiry into safety committees has to do 
with the number of persons attending the meetings. From 
Table V we see that the Class B companies have more members 
in their committees. This might well be expected since Class B 
companies probably include heavier representation from each 
level attending due to their larger size. From a total of 22 
Class A companies reporting, 100 per cent of the committees 
had less than 16 members, and 86.4 per cent had less than 11 
members. Only 5 companies from the Class B group had over 19 
members, and this represented only 10.0 per cent of the total 
of both classes. The mode for Class A was the 1-5 persons . 
bracket and for Class B was the 6-10 bracket. Although 
Class B has somewhat larger committees, this is to be expected. 
Little can be implied from the results except that in both 
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classes committee size has been kept down to manageable 
size. 
c. Co-operation With Insurance Carriers 
Table VI shows that the larger concerns work with 
their insurance carrier's safety engineer in more cases than 
do the smaller companies. This covers all types of organiza-
tions, not just committee organizations as previously discussed. 
This, to a limited extent, bears out, at least, one of t wo of 
our previous contentions~ that either the insurance company 
representatives are limited in their activities by cost factors 
which, in turn, are dependent upon the size of the risk and 
its accident record, or that smaller concerns do not realize 
what safety means to them and, therefore, are disinclined to 
work very hard by themselves or in conjunction with outside 
aids on a safety program. The difference, however, between 
the co-operative efforts of Class A and Class B is slight. 
9.5 per cent of Class A companies said that they did not work 
with their insurance carriers as against 2.4 per cent for 
Class B companies. These figures then are not at all conclu~ 
sive but, on the other hand, do not refute any previous con-
clusions drawn from analysis of the results. As shown in 
Table IV the insurance company representative attended a far 
higher percentage of safe committee meetings in the smaller 
companies than in the larger ones, but this is only an indi-
cation of the supposition that the insurance company repre-
sentative in trying to further safety committee organization 
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in smaller companies will consent to run, or, at least, con-
stantly guide them. This does not indicate a willingness of 
small companies to co-operate more with safety engineers of 
insurance companies, but may reflect the opposite viewpoint. 
TABLE VI 
CO-OPERATION WITH INSURANCE CARRIER 
Class A Class B Totals 
. Degree No. ~ No • ! No. ~ 
Large degree 27 64.2 33 80.3 60 72.2 
Not at all 4 9.5 1 2.4 5 6.2 
To limited extent 11 26.3 7 17.3 18 21.6 
Totals 42 100.0 41 100.0 83 100.0 
D. Foremen Safety Training Programs 
We have not yet investigated foremen safety training 
programs. For the; most part, these are given by the insurance 
companies. The program consists of conferences where through 
lectures, demonstrations and question periods, supervisors are 
given the facts of accident prevention. A conference outline 
used as a guide to the conference leader is contained in the 
Appendix on pages 114 through 122. This particular one is 
used by the safety engineers of the Employer's Liability Assur-
ance Corp., Ltd. of Boston. 
David Mould, Safety Director of the General Motors 
Corp., includes the foremen safety training courses as a basic 
part of the General Motors safety program. He states that, 
11 The foreman or other line supervisor is the member of manage-
ment with the primary responsibility for making the safety 
program work. We must have an effective safety training pro-
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gram for the supervisor."* 
Thus the foremen safety training course is con-
sidered essential to a complete safety program. This is also 
the beliefs of many safety engineers. 
TABLE VII 
PARTICIPATION IN FOREMEN SAFETY TRAINING PROGRAMS 
Class A Class B Totals 
Partici;Eation No. ~ No. tf No. ~ 
Participating 17 41.5 27 67.5 44 54.4 
Not participating 24 58.5 13 32.5 37 45.6 
Totals 41 100.0 40 100.0 81 100.0 
The Class B companies again lead in this a r ea, hav-
ing 26.0 per cent more companies who have participate.d i n 
foremen training classes. This is shown in Table VII. 
Class A has done well with 41.5 per cent of the companies 
having taken this training. The program is costly both for 
the insurance carrier and the companies, and it is a credit 
to them both that they have had as many programs as they have 
had. 
In surveying the results of the portion of the 
questionnaire dealing with organization, we can safely say 
that Class B tends more toward the organizational specializa-
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tion afforded by safety committees. Class B's safety committees 
are in a more advan tageous position since they meet more often 
and have greater t op management participation. They suffer 
li t tle from large membership and, seemingly, have better 
·U· 11 , p.l3 
co-operation with their insurance carriers. 
Organization is only a means to an end, and many 
ends have been gained without perfect organization. The 
personnel employed can make a good organization perform 
poorly, and a poor one function adequately. Soffie Class A 
companies may be doing a good job; but t he organization of 
Class B, both internal and external, has the advantage over 
Class A. If we assume that national averages can be applied 
to the local level, we can see by Table I on page 18 that the 
larger companies have progressively better and better fre-
quency and severity records. This must be attributed to 
organization to some degree. 
E. Investigation and Correction 
This area is one of the most important in safety 
work. Investigation of accidents as they occur and applica-
tion of corrective action so that they will not recur, is 
one of the main functions of a safety program, and is usually 
the first to evolve when a new safety program is instituted. 
TABLE VIII 
INVESTIGATION BY SAFETY ORGANI ZATION 
Class A Class B 
Investigation No. tf No. if 
Positive 35 79.5 37 92.5 
Negative 9 20 .5 3 7.5 
Totals 44 100.0 40 100. 0 
Totals 
No. 1f 
72 85.7 
12 14.3 
84 100.0 
Tab le VIII shows how many safety organizations in-
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vestigate their lost-time accidents after first being handled 
by the immediate supervisor. If the safety organization also 
investigates accidents, there is a better chance that more 
suitable action will be taken than if the accident were in-
vestigated by the supervisor alone. We see that Class B 
companies have 92.5 per cent of their accidents investigated 
by the safety organization as compared to 79.5 per cent for 
Class A companies. 
Just about every company who answered the ques-
tionnaire kept written reports of the facts of each lost-time 
accident. Table IX shows that 97.7 per cent of Class A 
companies and 97.5 per cent of Class B companies kept written 
reports. 
TABLE IX 
RECORDING AND MAINTAINING WRITTEN REPORTS ON ACCIDENTS 
Recording and Class A Class B Totals 
Maintaining No. ~ No. ! No. ~ 
Positive 42 97.7 40 97.5 82 97.6 
Negative 1 2.3 1 2.5 2 2.4 
....... 
Totals 43 100.0 41 100.0 84 100.0 
Table X would probably be the most important indica-
tion of all, but it is not discriminating. It answers the 
question of whether the companies queried took corrective 
action on all of their accidents. One hundred per cent of 
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both classes answered yes to this question. This shows a 
deflnite . interest in the prevention of reoccurrence of accidents. 
However, it does not show if the companies did a good job of 
corrective action. This was not ascertained. 
TABLE X 
CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN ON ACCIDENTS 
Class A Class B Totals 
Action Taken No. ~ ~ No. ! No. ! 
Positive 43 100.0 39 100.0 82 100.0 
Negative 
Totals 43 100.0 39 100.0 82 100.0 
We can see in Table XI how extensively companies 
investigate accidents which do not result in lost time. The 
classes were very close in this respect with 81.1 per cent 
of Class A and 90.0 per cent of Class B investigating acci-
dents not resulting in lost time. 
Although frequency and severity measures generally 
concern themselves only with lost-time accidents from a pre-
vention standpoint, non-lost-time accidents are usually just 
as important as those that do not result in lost time. In-
juries from accidents are not at all contro1lable. The same 
accident situation may result in their being no accident, in 
a no-injury accident, in a non-lost-time accident, in a lost-
time accident, or in a permanent disability dependent upon 
the exact conditions, which are never controllable. Thus, an 
accident which does not result in lost-time could easily have 
been a lost-time accident. Therefore, non-lost-time accidents 
present a lucrative faucet for accident investigation and 
correction. 
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TABLE XI 
INVESTIGATION OF ACCIDENTS OTHER THAN LOST .. TIME ACCIDENTS 
Class A Class B Totals 
Investigation No. tf No. ~ No. ~ 
Positive 37 88.1 36 90.0 73 89.0 
Negative 5 11.9 4 10.0 9 11.0 
Totals 42 100.0 40 100.0 82 100.0 
F. Interest 
Employee interest can be aroused by many means . 
In the questionnaire the companies surveyed were asked to 
check off which ones of the listed techniques they used to 
stimulate employee interest. This is summarized in Table XII. 
TABLE XII 
TECHNIQUES USED TO CREATE EMPLOYEE INTEREST 
Class A Class B Totals 
Techniques No. 2f No. ! No. tf 
Bulletin boards 39 86.7 39 95.0 78 90.8 
Posters 41 91.0 41 100.0 82 95.5 
Signs & slogans 26 57.8 28 68.4 54 62.8 
Trade magazines 6 13.3 9 22.0 15 17.4 
Newspaper articles 1 2.2 3 7.3 4 4.6 
Notices in pay 
envelopes 14 31.1 8 19.5 22 25.6 
Displays 7 15.6 13 31.7 20 23.3 
Contests 3 6.7 11 26.8 14 16.3 
Foremen talks 22 48.8 29 70.7 51 59.3 
Plant magazines 3 6.'7 6 14.6 9 10.5 
Manuals 9 20.0 16 39.0 25 29.1 
No. of compan~:es 
reporting 45 41 86 
Every company who replied answered this question 
giving a total of 86 answers. 
In both classes safety posters were the most common 
means of stimulating interest closely followed by the use of 
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bulletin board articles. These two average 95.5 per cent and 
90.8 per cent, respectively, for the total of both classes. 
The high use of these techniques is, no doubt, due to the fact 
that they are simple to use and are effective if used properly. 
For Class A companies, signs and slogans are in third 
place and foremen talks in fourth place, representing 57.8 and 
48.8 per cent, respectively. For the larger companies of 
Class B, these two positions were just reversed with foremen 
talks in third place with 70.7 per cent of the companies 
using this technique, and signs and slogans in fourth place 
at a level of 68.4 per cent. 
For Class A companies the use of notices in pay 
envelopes was used by 31.1 per cent of the companies, and 
manuals were used by 20.0 per cent. There was a total of 
six techniques used by 20 per cent or more of Class A 
companies. The average number of techniques used was 3.80. 
For Class B, ~~nuals were used to promote safety 
interest by 39.0 per cent of the companies, displays by 31.7 
per cent, contests by 26.8 per cent and trade magazine articles 
by 22.0 per cent. This gives Class B a total of eight tech-
niques used by more than 20 per cent of the companies. The 
average number of techniques used by Class B was 4.95, which 
is 1.15 more than for Class A. 
The use of newspaper articles was the least used of 
any technique representing only 2.2 per cent of Class A and 
7.3 per cent of Class B companies. This is probably due to 
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the fact that the companies are all located in a metropoli-
tan area where the chance and/or effectiveness of a publica-
tion of individual company safety news is slight, due to the 
size of the company and the wider function of the metropoli-
tan newspaper. In smaller communities where a company of the 
size surveyed plays a more dominant role in the economic 
prosperity of the cor@1unity, there would be much more opportu-
nity for creation of interest in individual plant safety 
through the medium of newspapers. 
The Class B companies outshine the Class A companies 
in the number of techniques used to stimulate employee interest. 
Class A companies lead in only one medium, that of using 
notices in pay envelopes. In the use of foremen talks, which 
is about the most direct and forceful method of arousing 
interest, Class B companies lead by 21.9 per cent and are 
ahead in all the rest by substantial margins. 
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V. Greater Boston Firms (Gontinued) 
A. Costs 
As would be expected, Class B companies spend more 
on accident prevention than do Class A companies. The median 
of Class A is in the 500-1,000 dollar bracket, and of Class B 
in the 1,000-2,000 dollar bracket. Only 10.4 per cent of the 
total of both classes spent less than 100 dollars on accident 
prevention; whereas 13.5 per cent of the total spent over 
$5,000. Those two companies, employing full-time safety 
directors, both spent over $5,000 on their safety programs. 
Based on the central value of the two medians, a 
Class A company spends an average of $750 per year on acci-
dent prevention, and a Class B company spends $1,500. If we 
take the assumed medians for the number of employees in each 
class, 175 for Class A and 375 for Class B, . and divide them 
into the total money values spent, we will arrive at an 
estimated figure of dollars spent on safety per year per 
employee. These figures come to $4.30 and $4 for Class A 
and Class B, respectively. 
All figures on costs are only estimates and should 
not be thought of as absolutely reliable. There is consider-
able accounting judgment involved in deciding which expenses 
can justifiably be allocated to accident prevention. For 
example, how much of the cost can be attributed to accident 
prevention when a company buys a new machine with built-in 
safety features, but which is also more efficient production-
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wise? This is a difficult question to answer and different 
companies will make different judgments which will, in turn, 
effect the estimate they make on the cost of accident preven-
tion. 
TABLE XIII 
COSTS OF ACCIDENT PREVENTION 
Class A Class B Totals 
Costs No. if No. ! No. 1f 
Up to $100 6 18.8 1 2.9 7 10.4 
100-500 8 25.0 8 22.9 16 23 •. 9 
500-1,000 10 31.1 ·s 22.9 18 26.9 
1,000-2,000 4 12.5 6 17.1 10 . 14.9 
2,000-5,000 1 3.1 6 17.1 7 10.4 
5~000-up 3 9.5 6 17.1 9 13.5 
Totals 32 100.0 35 100.0 67 100.0 
The significance of Table XIII is difficult to 
ascertain. The only logical conclusions are that accident 
prevention insituted through safety programs do constitute an 
appreciable cost and that the larger companies spend more on 
accident prevention than do smaller ones. 
B. Organization Types and Safety Programs 
In Chapter IV the safety organizations of the 
companies polled were analyzed by size groups. In this 
section the safety progr~1 will be analyzed with regard to 
the types of organization. The discussion, based upon the 
questionnaire results, will center on the comparison between 
the type of organization and the extent and intensity of the 
safety program. The effect of the size of the company ppon 
the safety program will be eliminated, leaving. the comparison 
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based upon the different types of safety organizational 
structure. 
The two measures. of the extent and intensity of the 
safety program to be used are: 1, the participation in fore-
men training courses and, 2, the number of methods used to 
create employee interest. A better criterion for the purpose 
of comparison would be accident frequency rates; but as pre-
viously discussed, these are not extensively calculated, and 
even if they are calculated, are not easily attainable by the 
writer. 
It is the basic assumption in all accident prevention 
work that the frequency rate varies to a large degree with the 
completeness and intensity of the accident prevention program.* 
We have taken as criteria two measures of this intensity and 
completeness - foremen safety training and number of methods 
used to create employee interest. 
Foremen safety training programs contribute to 
plant safety in at least three ways. First, since a safety 
training program requires that foremen and/or supervisors 
must take special time to receive the training, the foremen 
realize that management considers safety of considerable 
importance. Next, the program points out to foremen their 
responsibility in accident prevention. Lastly, it gives them 
the knowledge to go ahead with accident prevention using 
techniques and methods that have been proven successful in past 
* 7, p.557 
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applications. 
The number of methods used to create employee in-
terest in safety represents the promotional aspect of a safety 
program. Employee co-operation is necessary for the success 
of any safety program. "Ultimately, every employee should be 
held partly responsible for his own safety and for that of his 
fellow workers."* It is the aim of management through interest 
creating methods to get the employee continually to be aware 
of accident hazards and to assume some responsibility in their 
elimination. Personal hazards, or unsafe acts representing 
about 88 per cent of total hazards, *-l~ can be appreciably re-
duced by employee consciousness and action. 
Table XIV gives the comparison between the three 
basic organizational types and participation in foremen safety 
training programs. 
29.1 per cent of the companies using the line type 
of safety organization had participated in such programs. 
Based on size alone, the percentage of companies participating 
would have been 55.6. This figure of 55.6 per cent was arrived 
at by using the results of the comparison between the two 
company size groupings and participation in foremen safety 
training programs,- (Table VII). These figures were then 
weighted according to the number of companies from each of the 
two size groups present in the new grouping. 41.5 per cent of 
* . 5, p.323 
-!H~ 2, p.l'7 
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Class A companies and 67.5 per cent of Class B companies 
participated in foremen safety training courses. The weight-
ing calculations for the new grouping of line organization 
would be as follows: 
No. of Per Cent 
Com;Eanies Partici-Ea tion 
Class A 4 X 41.5 = 166 
Class B 5 X 67.5 = 338 
Total 9 504 
504 ~ 9 = 55.6% weighted average 
The difference between 55.6 per cent and 29.1 
per cent is 26.5 per cent which can be attributed to the type 
of safety organizational structure. 
Thus, line organization has 26.5 per cent less in 
terms of company participation in foremen safety training 
programs, safety committee organization 11.7 per cent more, 
and the safety director type of organization 32.5 per cent 
more than if the computation were based on size alone. 
TABLE XIV 
FORE~ffiN SAFETY TRAINING AND ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE 
Ty;Ee of Organization 
Line Committee 
Class A participation, 
number of companies 4 14 
Class B participation, 
number of companies 5 20 
Total number of companies 
surveyed 31 48 
.,-; participation, actual 29.1 68.9 /0 
<J~ participation, based on jo 
size alone 55.6 57.2 
% difference -26.5 +11.7 
Safety 
Director 
2 
2 
100.0 
67.5 
+32.5 
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Table XV, which deals with the number of methods 
used to arouse employee interest, gives similar results. 
Line organization employs 15.9 per cent fewer methods, 
co~~ittee organization employs 9.0 per cent more, and the 
safety director type employ 51.5 per cent more methods than 
would have been the case if size alone were the consideration. 
Using the assumptions that frequency is dependent 
upon the extent of the safety program, and that the two 
criteria of participation in foremen safety training courses 
and number of methods to arouse employee interest are measures 
of the extent and intensity of a safety program, we can con-
clude that companies employing the committee type of organi-
zation have more effective accident prevention programs and, 
therefore, better accident prevention records than do com-
panies employing the line type of safety organization. We 
can also conclude that those companies using the safety 
director type of organization have better safety records than 
do companies using either the line organization or the com-
mittee type of safety organization. 
The validity of this conclusion is in turn de-
pendent upon the validity of our assumptions. The first is 
generally accepted and has been proven over the years. From 
1930 through 1946 frequency rates have declined 53 per cent, 
from 30.1 to 14.16, and severity rates have declined by 46 
per cent, from 2.37 to 1.28.~~ The bulk of this reduction can 
* 7, p.556 
71 
only be accounted for by accident prevention programs. The 
second assumption is somewhat open to questioning, but these 
two f actors certainly represent a sampling of the totality 
of any safety program. Thus, it is apparent that there is 
validity in the suppositions and, therefore, validity in the 
conclusions. 
It shall be noted that the conclusions do not state 
that better accident prevention programs are brought about by 
the t ype of safety organization, but rather that there is a 
relationship between them. 
Since the sample of companies using the safety 
director type of organization is small, less validity can 
be placed upon the comparison between line organization and 
safety committee organization. 
TABLE XV 
METHODS OF CREATING EMPLOYEE I NTEREST 
AND ORGANIZATIONAL TYPE 
Type of Organization 
Cl ass A, average no. of 
methods 
Class A, no. of companies 
Class B, average no. of 
methods 
Class B, no. of companies 
Composite average no. of 
methods, actual 
Composite average no. of 
methods, based on size 
alone 
Difference % Difference 
Line 
3.4 
22 
3.7 
10 
3.49 
4~ 15 
- .66 
-15.9 
Committee 
4.2 
23 
5.2 
29 
4.75 
4.45 
+ .40 
+9.0 
Safety 
Director 
7.5 
2 
7.50 
4.95 
+2.55 
+51.5 
72 
c. Branch Plants and Safety Programs 
Table XVI compares the differences in the safety 
programs between branch plants and independently operated 
plants. 
Of a total of 83 plants, 17 were definitely affi-
liated with larger organizations. The branch plants were the 
only ones which used the safety director type of organization. 
A comparison between the other two types of organization shows 
that there is little difference between their use in branch 
and independent plants. The ratio between the number of com-
panies using line organization to the total of both line and 
committee types of organization was .665 for branch plants, 
and .635 for independently operated plants. 
Branch plants participated in foremen safety train-
ing programs to a .3 per cent greater extent that if the 
measures had been based on plant size alone. They used an 
average of 1.3 more interest creating methods over pure size 
considerations representing a 28.9 per cent increase. 
Independent plants participated in foremen safety 
training programs to a 2.0 per cent greater extent than if 
size had been the only consideration. They used an average 
of .3 less interest creating methods representing a 6.8 
per cent decrease compared to measures based on company size 
alone. 
The comparison in the area of participation is not 
discrim~ating. Both groups increased slightly which, no 
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doubt, is due to error of statistical assumptions. It can 
only be stated that there is little difference between the 
t wo groups in this area. 
TABLE XVI 
BRANCH PLANTS AND SAFETY PROGRAMS 
No. of cos. with line organization 
No. of cos. with safety committees 
No. of co s . with safety directors 
No. of cos. having participated in 
foremen safety tra:1ning programs 
Total companies reporting % participation, actual % participation, based on size alone 
% difference 
Average number of methods used to 
create employee interest, actual 
Average number of methods, based on 
size alone 
Difference % Difference 
Type of Plant 
Branch 
10 
5 
2 
10 
17 
58.7 
58.4 
+·3 
5.8 
4.5 
+1.3 
+28.9 
All Others 
42 
24 
35 
62 
56.5 
54.5 
+2.0 
4.1 
4.4 
- .3 
-6.8 
I n the area of employee interest there is discri-
ruination. Branch plants were found to be ahead of indepen-
dent pl ants in the number of methods used to create employee 
interest. 
Since the two indicies do not give the same results, 
no generalizations can be made. Two indicators point t hat 
branch plants do have better programs. Those were the use of 
safety directors and use of employee interest creating methods. 
There were no discriminating indications that branch plants 
had a poorer safety program than independent plants. 
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D. Individual Companies 
Three companies gave rather complete outlines of 
their safety organization and setup when they returned their 
questionnaire. These three illustrations of Class B com-
panies will show how some organizations work. 
One manufacturer of baking specialties reports on 
its safety committee as being made up of between 16-20 mem-
bers who meet monthly. The committee is composed of a 
representative from each department (employees), repre-
senta t i ve a from the foremen's group and a representative of 
t op management. The whole program is under the Personnel 
Dept. and is very active in trying to promote interest in 
safety. 
Another company which manufactures soap has two 
safety comrnittees and a full-time safety director. The 
Superintendents' Safety Committee meets monthly and includes 
the safety director and three foremen. The Factory Safety 
Committee meets weekly and includes the safety directors, 
three foremen and six· employees. The safety director gets 
the backing and support of top management. The committees 
are quite active in administering corrective action and 
creating interest. This company spends over $5,000 each 
year on its accident prevention program. 
A gelatin manufacturer outlines its safety organi-
~ation as follows: 
A. - Plant Safety Conooittee - a policy making group 
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meeting every two weeks composed of the following members: 
(1) Chairman (Personnel Manager) 
(2) Secretary (Safety Coordinator - member of Personnel 
Dept.) 
(3) Plant Engineer 
(4) Plant Superintendent 
(5) Assistant to Manager of Mfg. and Engr. 
(6) Maintenance Foreman 
(7) Purchasing Agent 
(8) Shop Steward 
B. - Supervisors' Monthly Safety Meeting (training 
meeting). 
c. - Department Safety Meetings - The chairman, an 
employee from the hourly rated group, conducts a meeting with 
foreman or supervisor. Before each meeting the department is 
thoroughly inspected by the chairman and foreman for unsafe 
conditions. Meetings are held twice each month. 
This company is a branch plant of a national manu-
facturer. The company works closely with its insurance com-
pany's safety engineer. Investigation and corrective action 
are taken on both lost-time and non-lost-time accidents. The 
comp~ny is very active in trying to create employee interest 
using 10 of the 11 techniques listed in the questionnaire. 
Although they spend more than $5,000 on their safety activi-
ties, they do not employ safety engineers. They give the 
following reason for this, "The corporation feels it is a 
staff function with responsibility delegated to the first-line 
foremen and supervisors. A member of the Personnel Dept. 
coordinates the accident prevention program in each unit." 
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E. Conclusions 
In discussing Greater Boston firms, the writer has 
made conclusions on each aspect of the questionnaire as pre-
sented. A general summary will be presented here. 
In the area of organization Class B companies 
employed a larger percentage of the safety committee type than 
did Class A. There also were two companies in Class B who 
used full-time safety directors. The safety comn1ittees of 
Class B had more frequent and less irregular meetings than 
did those of Class A. Also the top and middle management 
representation on safety committees was more prevalent in 
Class B. Class B had larger committees but not so large as 
to be cumbersome. More Class B companies worked with their 
insurance carrier's safety engineer than did those of Class A, 
and also more Class B companies had participated in foremen 
safety training programs. In total, the organizational setup, 
both internal and external, of Class B companies seems to be 
more suited to the smooth and effective operation of a safety 
program. 
In the areas of investigation and correction, Class B 
companies lead those of Class A since accidents were investi-
gated to a greater degree by their safety organization rather 
than the immediate supervisor. They also excelled on the in-
vestigation of lost-time accidents. All the companies in both 
classes stated that they took corrective action after each 
accident to prevent recurrence. It is of interest to know 
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this fact, but the results of the corrective action is 
what is important. On this we have no figures. Even so, 
the results show that Class B is in a stronger position in 
these areas. 
Interest techniques are used to a greater degree 
in the Class B companies. Out of a total of 11 possibilities, 
the average number of techniques utilized by Class A was 
3.80 and for Class B, 4.95. Class B was considerably stronger 
in the use of the technique of foremen talks and contests, two 
of the best interest stimulators. 
As would be expected, Class B companies spent more 
on accident prevention than dld those of Class A. No com-
parative conclusions can be drawn from the figures except 
that the institution of accident prevention methods and 
techniques involve expense. 
If the comparison between Class A and Class B com-
panies were extended, the results would be similar. The 
larger companies would have better safety programs and the 
smaller companies would have poorer ones. This conclusion is 
bolstered by the accepted conclusion that accident frequency 
and severity are directly related to the effectiveness of the 
safety program. As shown in Table I, the frequency and 
severity of accidents improves as the company size becomes 
greater. Therefore, safety programs generally improve with 
the size of the organization. 
When the companies were classed according to their 
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organization type and the size factor eliminated, the safety 
director type of organization had the best safety programs, 
followed next by committee organization and then, finally, by 
line organization. The measures of the safety program used 
were participation in foremen safety training programs and 
the number of methods used to create en1ployee interest. 
On the same basis of comparison, branch plants with 
outside affiliations were not found to have superior safety 
programs as compared with independently operated plants. Of 
interest was the fact that both plants which used safety di-
rectors were branch plants. 
One of the returns had a very interesting criti-
cism of the questionnaire and I quote, "I believe you may 
have the emphasis on the statistical aspect of the problem 
and left out the human side. We have reduced our losses 
very markedly this year and yet in your questionnaire no~ 
one of the questions covers the points we think were effective 
in reducing the loss •••• The physical aspect of a safety pro-
gram doesn't do too much one way or another to control the 
situation. It is the human side or the attitude of the men 
supervising the program and the employees that counts most." 
This is a valid criticism and one that is recognized 
by the writer. It was not the intent of the questionnaire to 
investigate attitudes but merely to gather facts. It is high-
ly doubtful that a simple questionnaire could distinguish 
attitudes. 
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It is the intent of the writer that the remainder 
of the thesis shall be spent in studying the human side of 
the safety picture. This will be done by studying actual 
cases and giving a thorough analysis to each one as to the 
effect of attitudes on the safety program. Also some attention 
will be given to special safety problems inherent in the par-
ticular types of company operations. 
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1. Case 
VI. Case Studies 
A. J & K Iron Works 
The J & K Iron Works is engaged in the fabrication 
and erection of iron structures. The company premises con-
sist of about 7 large-sized, sheet metal sided, shed-type 
buildings containing 10 heavy-duty traveling cranes. There 
are also cranes for outside work in the yards. Fabrication 
includes cutting, shearing, drilling, punching, bolting, 
riveting and welding. Completed fabrications are sprayed 
and/or brush-painted as an outdoor operation. During the 
war J & K fabricated landing boats for the government, and 
more recent operations include building and bridge construc-
tion as well as repair. 
From the time of the war to date, the company has 
been visited by its workmen's compensation insurance carrier 
for the purpose of reducing the number of accidents to the 
employees. These visits were generally on a monthly or bi-
monthly basis, but during some periods were on a semi-
monthly basis. There has been no formal safety program set 
up 1n the plant although management did come into some con-
tact with the safety movement through the safety engineer 
of the insurance carrier. 
After the war, top management realized that their 
accident experience had been poor and were seemingly anxious 
to improve it. Poor experience was costing the company a 
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considerable amount for their insurance coverage which was 
baaed on an experience rating plan. They wanted to reduce 
this cost as well as the suffering that went along with it. 
In December of 1946, Mr. K, president, decided to 
assemble a book of sketches, illustrations and directions 
which would exemplify the safe way for his men to perform 
their duties. The company employed about 130 men at that 
time, but has now expanded to about 200. These men (130) 
were all members of the Iron Workers' Union, a union that 
consisted of about 400 men employed locally. The idea was 
to gain the co-operation of the union, and then through the 
union to launch a series of safety instruction meetings based 
on this illustrated book. 
The book was compiled, printed and distributed to 
all members of the union. In June of 1947, classes were 
started in which the entire Iron Workers' Union was present. 
Things ran along smoothly for a few weeks with J & K footing 
the bill at about $100 per week. Then the meetings were 
suddenly suspended. According to Mr. K, the reason was 
suspicion by other companies that J & K Co. had some ulter-
ior motive in backing this program. 
After this rebuff of their attempts at a safety 
program, management became l0ath to take up the cause again. 
Their accident frequency record remained poor for the year 
of 1947, and the death of one employee, due to an unsafe 
act, gave them a very poor severity record as well. 
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In the latter part of 1947, and all of 1948, the 
insurance carrier was asking to be allowed to hold foremen's 
safety meetings in order to arouse interest and install 
workable techniques in accident prevention. 
The management was not willing to do this. Their 
reasoning was based on the following grounds~ 1. The company 
was presently having difficulty with their union and after 
the first episode it seemed advisable not to stir things up 
again. 2. They also considered the fact that they had a 
low type of labor and that they could not easily get their 
interest aroused in accident prevention. Shortly before this 
date, management made a proposal whereby the company would 
pay SO% of the premium on a group life insurance plan for the 
employees and the plan had received no response. They be-
lieved employee reaction would be the same toward an accident 
prevention program. 3. Probably the greatest disadvantage 
to a foreman training program was the way the company super-
vision was presently organized. The management consisted 
of a Mr. L, who ran the office, a Mr. K, the president, who 
supervised production, and a ~w. J, who assisted Mr. K. 
These three men constituted the entire supervisory force. 
About 12 or 15 long-serviced, experienced men are given 15p 
above the top rate to act as foremen and push certain jobs. 
When the job is completed, the temporary foreman again assumes 
the status of a worker. If foramens' meetings were to be 
held, management thought certain morale problems and jeal-
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ousies would develop between the men who were not chosen to 
attend and those who were. This supervisory structure was 
able to operate the business profitably in this manner due 
to the fact that new help was hired through the union and 
was, for the most part, already trained. 
The management did agree that accident prevention 
fell on the supervisory shoulders, and in December of 1948, 
decided to investigate all accidents, make written foreman 
reports to the insurance company and apply corrective action 
on each accident case. None of tpese activities had been 
carried out before this time in the company. 
Almost directly after the assumption of this 
responsibility , management_ found itself s~ pressed by other 
problems that it discontinued accident investigation of 
minor accidents anticipating that their time could be more 
profitably spent with more pressing matters rather than in 
this type of investigation. 
Their accident experience contined poor with the 
corresponding high direct and indirect costs. During 1949, 
the company experienced a two-months' strike which left them 
far behind in their production. When the strike was over, 
many additional workers were employed to catch up on back 
orders. This added greatly to the supervision problem, be-
cau se the new men were less experienced. This fact contri-
buted to the high frequency rate. 
In January of 1950, a foremen's training program 
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was run on about 50% of the temporary foremen by the insurance 
carrier. It was agreed that if the first group was helped, 
a second group would also be processed. Five meetings were 
held and the following results for the group were obtained: 
1. The group became interested in accident problems. 
2. Need for foremen interest and co-operation was 
established. 
3. I mprovement of plant conditions by the foremen 
was realized. 
4. Accident investigation to ascertain cause was 
explained and foremen instructed bow to make 
out foreman accident report forms and to apply 
corrective measures on unsafe acts and/or 
conditions. 
5. Top management agre.ed to review all foremen 
accident reports. 
6. Top management agreed to co-operate 100% with 
any suggestions or recommendations made if they 
would help reduce accident frequency. 
7. Future safety meetings were to be held. 
The effects of this program resulted in an improve-
ment in general housekeeping and an effort to maintain a 
closer safety supervision of employees. 
Another problem that had plagued J & K for some 
time was the failure of employees to wear goggles while grind-
ing. Formerly, it was thought that lack of close supervision 
coupled with the poor employee attitude was the cause of 
employees not wearing goggles and receiving subsequent minor 
eye injuries. Even after closer safety-minded supervision 
was initiated, employees still refused to wear goggles. It 
was decided to attack the problem from another angle and to 
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install permanent shield guards directly on the grinders. 
This was done and the number of eye injuries was cut down 
considerably. Although some improvement was shown after the 
foramens' meetings, no substantial reduction in the frequency 
rate was effected. As the year progressed with no follow-up, 
the effects of the foramens' meetings wore off and conditions 
became about the same as before the meetings. Although the 
insurance carrier continually requested permission to run a 
training program for the second group, to set up a permanent 
safety organization, and to install other techniques to make 
employees safety conscious, management had declined. They 
believed that a safety program was not necessary, even though 
their workmen's compensation insurance was costing them an 
extra $14,000 per year in premiums. 
In April of 1952, J & K had a particularly bad 
accident in which one of their best foremen was needlessly, 
totally disabled when a heavy angle that had been poorly 
stacked fell on him as he was walking over it instead of 
around it. Management still did not consider a safety pro-
gram necessary, but in July found themselves shifted over to 
a special risk basis known as The Retrospective Plan. They 
were now practically insuring themselves. Premiums paid were 
equal to the insurance payments to injured employees during 
the period unless a very high maximum was reached. In that 
event the carrier would suffer the remaining losses. 
In early 1953, J & K began regular safety meetings 
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of all its foremen on a monthly basis. These meetings have 
not as yet received the full backing of top management. They 
are allowed rather than required and, therefore, progress 
has been very slow. Accident frequency and severity have 
both been very severe for 1953, and one death occurred during 
the year that should have been prevented. 
2. Remarks 
Accident prevention is a full-time job. It cannot 
be carried on haphazardly or intermittently and properly be 
expected to obtain results. The management of J & K Co. do 
not seem to realize this; they evidently expect results with-
out much effort on their part, and were disappointed when 
results were not realized. 
Direct insurance costs were about $14,000 per year 
and rising. The indirect cost would send the estimated costs 
of accidents to a considerably higher figure. A conservative 
estimate, using a multiplier of 2, would set the cost of acci-
dents into the vicinity of $40,000 per year. This is a tre-
mendous cost for any company to needlessly bear. 
The foremen's safety training course was given to 
half of the supervisory crew by their insurance carrier, but 
there was no follow through. The safety program died. There 
was no proper investigation, no proper corrective action 
taken, and no continuing safety program. The reason is that 
there was no top management support or backing given to the 
safety function. 
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Constant urging by the insurance carrier for the 
institution of a formal safety program has thus far been of 
little avail. It has, however, stirred top management into 
some contemplation. They have been considering making plant 
safety and accident prevention the major function of Mr. J 1 s 
son who will s oon come into the business. To date no action 
has been taken on this proposition. 
The J & K Co. has had many serious accidents. After 
each one, the top management has shown a great deal of interest 
in accident prevention and for a time handled the safety 
activities themselves. As is likely to be the case with line 
organization, the activities soon became subordinate to pro-
duction problems. As time progressed and the memory of the 
severe accident faded away, so did the safety activities fade 
away until such time as another serious accident occurred. 
Then, the cycle began again. Top management concerned itself 
with accident prevention, only later to relegate it again into 
the unattended. 
Accident prevention should be formalized in this 
company. A safety director should be appointed or a safety 
cow~ittee should be set up so that there will be a permanent 
nucleus of personnel to build a workable safety program. 
The safety organization should be given the support and back-
ing of top management and, above all, should not be allowed 
to collapse. 
This will be difficult to accomplish for J & K Co. 
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until such time as top management has displaced its apathy 
toward the safety function and replaced it with a true de-
sire to reduce accidents. The methods of accident preven-
tion can be readily adopted by this or any other company. 
It is only their point of view or apathy in the 
area of accident prevention that must be resolved. 
B. The ~ ~~ Inc. 
1. Case 
The q Co., Inc. is a local brewery employing 
about 250 persons. In the late spring of 1950 this company 
recognized that its accident costs were excessively high. 
In order to reduce these costs they formed a safety committee 
which was headed by the superintendent of the Bottling Dept. 
The committee was composed of four department heads, four 
employees and four shop stewards. The objects of the 
committee were: 
1. Regular monthly safety committee meetings. 
2. Physical inspection of departments by 
committee members. 
3. Intra-department safety contest sponsorship. 
4. Dept. bulletin board erection and use . 
5. Stress corrective action of unsafe acts and 
conditions. 
6. Devise means and ways of stimulating employee 
interest in accident prevention. 
During the early summer months of 1950, the 
committee meetings were cancelled with the assumption that 
they would be resumed in the fall. Although some activity 
toward reaching the desired objectives was carried on, this 
was merely a perfunctory attempt at a safety program. Contest 
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material was posted on bulletin boards each month along with 
a message from the president, but there was no true "spark 
plugging" or strong support by top management. The accident 
record remained poor, and in the late surrm1er the Q Co. re-
ceived a rate increase in their workmen's compensation in-
surance which was on an experience rating plan. This hit 
home. Direction of the safety committee was taken over by 
the president. He immediately re-established the committee, 
and monthly meetings became mandatory. For the remainder 
of the year the committee, now called the ~ Council, guided 
by the safety engineer of the insurance carrier, got its 
program under way. 
All accidents were discussed at the council meet-
ings to determine the cause factors and their possible elimi-
nation. The council's decisions on corrective action were 
based on a complete analysis of the situation and were binding. 
This not only helped the immediate . situation, but also edu-
cated the council members as to the theory of accidents and 
their prevention. 
Safety inspections were made each month by a special 
committee of the council set up for that purpose. Their 
recommendations were submitted to the council for approval. 
Upon approval, the task of carrying out the recommendations 
was immediately assigned to one or more of the council mem-
bers, who would make a report of his actions at the next 
meeting. Corrective action could be taken so quickly be-
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cause of the backing of top management. 
A comprehensive safety contest was set up between 
the different departments. This contest was implemented by 
a log book kept at the first-aid station, which kept track of 
all accidents. Entries in this log could only be made by 
authorized first-aid personnel. The log was reviewed each 
month by the council to see which accidents should be 
charged to the various departments. A penalty was set up 
so that any department reporting an accident later than the 
start of the next shift would be charged extra for the late 
reporting. 
On January 1, 1951, the ~Co., Inc. joined the 
Industrial Section of the Massachusetts Safety Council and 
entered the state-wide contest sponsored by that group. 
The council operated continuously during the year 
and despite their efforts both frequency and severity nearly 
doubled. This did not make the management feel adversely 
toward the council but, rather, prompted the following 
announcement by the president:: 
"The Q. Safety Council met for the first time in 
1952 and formulated plans that its members believe will be 
materially helpful in reducing accidents in 1952. 11 
"In order to accomplish our aims, the Council has 
decided that the shop stewards, who are permanent members 
of the Council, will appoint each month a different member 
from their department to sit in on the Council meetings. In 
this manner at least 36 diffe r ent men will have an opportunity 
during the year to see bow the Council functions at its 
meetings and, more important, to lend their aid and experience 
in the Council activities." 
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"A good safety record cannot be made by the Safety 
Council alone. The Council must have the co-operation of all 
employees as the safety record is made by them, and the 
Council can only help toward this end." 
"The reward for a good safety record is absence of 
physical suffering and financial hardship. It is the hope of 
the Council that every individual in the plant will receive 
this reward in 1952. 11 
During 1952 the Q. Safety Council worked in earnest. 
They decided that the policies instituted by the council 
should be reviewed from time to time in order to determine 
if they were being followed out and, if so, what had been 
their effect. 
Safety films were shown to the Council and to the 
whole body of employees. 
The problem of goggles, which had plagued the 
company for a long time, was again attacked. The result was 
that prescription goggles were obtained at company expense 
for workers who required them and that the rules regarding 
areas where goggles should be worn, such as in the Bottling 
Dept., were strictly enforced. Due to the campaign in this 
area, eye accidents were greatly reduced. 
The Council published a resume' of the Council 
meetings which were distributed to all Committee members 
and posted on the bulletin boards. This resume' helped 
maintain interest and also served as a reminder to those who 
were assigned to implement the recommendations of the Council. 
Written notices of scheduled meetings were sent by the presi-
dent to the Council members. Attendance remained mandatory. 
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The Red Cross was called in to give first-aid 
lessons to employees in order to cut down on the severity 
of accidents by quick, effective treatment of injuries. 
These lessons were given to three men from each department. 
The Q Safety Council made up a safety rule book 
that was published and distributed to each employee. 
The year 1952 brought a considerable reduction in 
frequency and severity as compared to the previous year, but 
Council activity continued strong, and new methods of creat-
ing interest were adopted. 
One new means of creating interest used is a large 
clock-like billboard that is set up where it can be seen by 
all employees as they enter the plant. The clock hand points 
to the number of man-hours worked by the plant without a 
lost-time accident. The idea is to get the hand to read as 
many man-hours of accident free time as possible~ 
Another unique method is the use of flags. On 
either side of the clock are two flagpoles. On one there 
are five flags of various colors, one for each department. 
If, during the month, a department has a lost-time accident, 
the colored flag is removed from the flagpole and a black 
flag, representing that department, is put on the other flag-
pole. 
Two plaques are given each month to the depart-
ments with the beat recorda as a stimulus toward departmental 
safety. 
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A drive was started to get employees in the Trans-
portation Department and the Bottling Department to wear 
safety shoes. To foster this end the company contributes 
$2 toward the purchase of each pair. of safety shoes. 
All drivers and helpers in the Transportation 
Department were given a demonstration on the correct way of 
lifting in an attempt to reduce lifting accidents. 
The year 1953 was not a good year, accident-wise; 
but a memo from the president expressed the attitude of the 
top management as follows: 
"During the last five years the Brewing Industry 
Accident Frequency Rate showed a steady decline; whereas 
for the last five years the Q Co. Inc. Accident Frequency 
Rate has increased. There were some breweries comparable 
in size to ours who worked through the year without any 
lost-time accidents. IT CAN BE DONE HERE." 
2. Remarks 
Although this company does not now have a good 
frequenc~ record, the Q Council is working seriously on 
accident prevention. Their program has not as yet been 
effective, but both the Q Co., Inc. and their compensation 
carrier have every reason to believe that it will produce 
results in the future. The program has been in effect for 
three years. During those three years the ~ Council has 
learned much about accident prevention methods and techni-
ques. They have been successful in reducing eye accidents. 
They have a sound organizational structure and all safety 
activities have the full backing and support of top manage-
ment. 
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The ~ Council has worked out some unique methods 
fo r crea ting employee interest. They show every indication 
of be coming more and more effective in accident prevention 
as time goes on. 
The attitude of the management is excellent. 
Company co-operation with their insurance carrier's safety 
engineer is also good. The accidents which have taken place 
have been of a very diverse nature and no one type has been 
predominant. This means that the accident prevention program 
must be broad and cover all phases of the company operations. 
Their program does meet this qualification. 
As the management becomes better and better ac-
quainted with the ~fplication of accident prevention methods 
and techniques, and still further incorporate them into their 
dally job of supervision, the accident frequency rate of the 
Q Company should improve. 
Right now, the management is engaged in a compre-
hensive safety program. Real progress seems only to be just 
around the corner. 
-c. The S Rubber .2£• 
1. Case 
The S Rubber Co. is a manufacturer of various types 
of laytex rubber products including rug compound, packing for 
expansion joints, football and basketball bladders, toy bal-
loons, nonskid rug compound and various other molded rubber 
products. There are about 160 employees, most of whom work 
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in dipping and finishing departments. The types of machinery 
used include rubber mills, table saws, band saws, circle 
knives and clickers. 
The safety activity is handled by the plant superinten-
dent as a part of his regular activities. The plant is a 
branch plant but operates its safety activities autonomously. 
The accident frequency and severity rates have been good. 
Plant safety conditions are good and the attitude of manage-
ment appears satisfactory. 
The S Rubber Co. has had a long battle with derma-
titus, a skin rash caused by an allergy toward specific 
substances. This disease is not of a serious nature but re-
quires that the afflicted person be removed from contact with 
the offensive substance. This usually means he must be 
transferred to another job. 
This disease is quite common in the rubber industry 
and is individualized in that all people are not allergic 
to the same things. After isolation from the substance, the 
rash disappears in a few days and leaves no adverse effect. 
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This disease was much more common years ago when 
dirty oil was used over and over again without cleaning for 
the lubrication of machinery. The bacteria content of the oil 
would become large and many cases of dermatitus would break 
out. Today, oils used in that manner are kept cleaner. Also 
additives are placed in the oil which kill off the bacteria. 
This practice has greatly reduced the' number of cases of 
dermatitus from this source. Dermatitus in the rubber indus-
try does not necessarily come from a material with a high 
bacteria content.* 
The management has been constantly on guard against 
materials (usually liquids) which are highly conducive to 
the contraction of dermatitus. When a case appears, the patch 
test is given to determine what material caused the disease. 
The offensive material is then further tested. The patch 
test consists of rubbing the material into a small portion or 
patch of human skin. If a rash breaks out then the material 
is responsible for the disease. 
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The best prevention against this disease is thorough 
cleansing of any body surfaces which come in contact with 
materials that might produce dermatitus. Management was well 
aware of this and constantly urged and directed thorough wash-
ing by the men involved in those operations where dermatitus 
had previously appeared. 
Dermatitus is an occupational disease but its 
treatment in a prevention program is so similar to the pre-
vention of an accident that it has been included in this dis-
cussion. 
Another accident problem had to do with buffing 
wheels. Because the work was so varied,guards could not be 
used on the wheels. Therefore, face guards and hair nets 
(for female operators) were required. This evolved a constant 
* 20 
problem since operators ofttimes removed their face shields 
after finishing a buffing operation. One man had a box in 
his hand when he took off his face shield. As he turned,the 
box came in contact with the turning wheel, was pulled from 
his hands, and thrown into his face resulting in a minor 
accident. 
Management recognized ita accident prevention 
problema and handled them through good supervision. They 
were keen on good housekeeping, correct storage of raw 
materials, machine guarding and proper exhaust systems. 
Other areas of supervision were well handled and a respecta-
ble safety record has been produced. 
2. Remarks 
The S Company is typical of many small companies. 
Accident prevention is considered seriously but is handled 
directly by the line management. As long as the frequency 
rate remains good, no special attention is given to an acci-
dent prevention program. When trouble arises adequate steps 
are taken by the management as a regular part of line duties. 
Many small companies operating in this manner main-
tain reasonably good frequency records. These records can be 
attributed to numerous factors such as high quality of super-
vision, few hazards inherent in the occupations, high grade 
employees and many others. 
Complex accident prevention programs are not a 
necessity for every company. · They can only be justified by 
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a definite need and should always pay for themselves in the 
long run. 
The S Rubber Company is in an enviable position as 
far as accident prevention is concerned. They have a good 
accident record without a high degree of concentration on 
safety programs. Their position is one which many other com-
panies try unsuccessfully to obtain. 
Safety is instituted through supervisory control 
in this company. It will, no doubt, continue to remain so 
as long as the frequency rate is kept in line. If the fre-
quency rate does rise out of control, more formalized -ac t ion 
will need to be taken in the area of accident prevention. 
D. The P Paper Box Company 
1. Case 
The P. Co. is a paper box manufacturer employing 
about 175 persons. Their operations take place in five major 
departments known as Printing, Cutting and Scoring, s. and 
S., Q,uad-Sta:y and Shipping Departments. The s. and s. Dept. 
utilizes a number of Stokes & Smith machines which glue paper 
covers on the cardboard. The ~uad Dept. utilizes a nmnber of 
~uad machines which bring up the sides of the boxes and glue 
the corners with a thin strip of paper. 
The Personnel Manager, in charge of the safety pro-
gram, brings up the subject of safety at production meetings 
held about once a month on Saturday mornings. These meetings 
are attended by the Plant Supt., Personnel Mgr. and all the dept-
ment foremen. Meetings are not held during the summer months. 
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Emphasis on safety consumes only a small part of the commit-
tee 1 s time and effort. 
After a number of good years, as far as accident 
prevention was concerned, the P Co. found that their severity 
rate was very high. Their compensation insurance carrier had 
requested review and improvement of their safety program. 
An examination of the severity rate showed that there had 
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been four bad accidents during the year 1951 which had given 
the company a poor severity rate. This was primarily a luck 
factor which by itself did not reflect the accident prevention 
program. A review of the frequency rate showed that the 
P Co. compared favorably against national averages for the 
industry. 
The concern of the insurance company did stimulate 
the management of the P Co. to make a review of their safety 
program which is outlined as follows: 
1. Daily plant inspections by Personnel Manager. 
2. Forelady over all girls operating piecework 
machines to make sure safety is not sacrificed 
for speed. 
3. Foremen Production Meetings which include 
safety topics. 
4. Complete instruction on machine operation 
(do's and don' t's ) 
5. Foremen investigation, correction and reporting 
of accidents. Also use of written Supervisors 
Report of Accident# 
6. Review of all accidents by Personnel Manager. 
7. Use of safety posters. 
8. Encouragement of all employees to report all 
accident hazards to their foremen. 
The review of the accident prevention program 
# See Appendix p.l23 
and subsequent intensity and improvement of accident preven-
tion methods reduced the frequency for the next year. There 
were no serious accidents in '52 or '53 and the severity rate 
returned to normal. 
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One of the accident problems that had been prevalent 
in the past had to do with the Smith and Stokes machines. The 
female operators often got their fingers caught and jammed 
by the rubber plungers which were used to glue on the covers. 
These accidents were not serious, since they resulted only 
in bruised fingers. However, the same accident type was very 
frequent and very persistent. With better supervision the 
frequency was reduced, but the accident type could not be 
eliminated. The P Co. had placed special, experienced fore-
women in this department who acted as instructors and 
supervisors over the female operators. 
The next step was the replacement of the rubber 
plungers by a new type of nylon brush which did the same 
job. This reduced the frequency of finger accidents in this 
department even more. 
Since late 1952 the P Co. has been replacing the 
Smith and Stokes Glueing Machines with automatic machines 
which do not require hand feeding. One new automatic 
machine will replace 3 old-type machines, and the chance of 
finger accidents is practically nil. 
Housekeeping had been a problem of this company. 
It was not a serious one, but it should be recognized that 
poor housekeeping creates psychological hazards as well as 
unsafe conditions. Housekeeping has been turned over to a 
porter who operates on a full-time basis. His job is to 
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keep paper scrap away from machines, keep the general premises 
clean and, more important, to keep the stock well behind the 
lines that define the isles. 
In 1954 the P Co. joined the National Association 
of Paper Box Manufacturers in their nation-wide accident 
prevention campaign. This consists of each paper box manu-
facturer reporting their accidents, accident types and 
monthly frequency rate to the National Association. In turn, 
each manufacturer receives a news letter outlining the safety 
activities and accident prevention ideas ·being utilized by 
other plants. The news letter gives the conteat winners' 
names and their frequency rates. It also encourages plants 
to submit to the Association a review of their safety activi-
ties or any unusual or special safety activities which might 
be of general interest to paper box manufacturers. 
2. Remarks 
The P Co. handles a considerable portion of its 
safety activities right along with other production activities. 
This is feasible as long as safety does not become ignored. 
If this happens, accidents are likely to increase and eventually 
assume the proportions of a serious problem. 
The attitude of both the Personnel Manager and the 
Plant Manager toward safety appear good. The Personnel 
Manager is quite active in this area and has the complete 
support of the Plant Manager. 
Their participation with the National Association 
of Paper Box Manufacturers in a safety contest is a further 
healthy sign. It shows interest in safety. The publication 
of the Association may also propose some specialized safety 
activities which can be applied to the P Co's. operations. 
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VII. Conclusions 
A. Trend 
The trend over the years of industrial accidents 
as measured by the industrial accident frequency rate has 
been dovmward. Figures of the National Safety Council show 
that the industrial frequency rate was cut more than two-
thirds during the period from 1926 to 1950. However, an 
upswing and higher rate was experienced during the war. 
This increase was attributed to the increased use of un-
skilled labor utilized during the war, and the consequent 
difficulties of supervision and training. After the war 
the frequency rate dropped steadily downward and has reached 
levels lower than prewar.* 
B. Cause 
The chief reason for t he decr easing rate is the 
increasing use of accident prevention methods and techniques. 
Large companies, such as General Motors, have instituted com-
plete safety programs covering all phases of accident pre-
vention. Smaller companies have not as yet progressed in the 
area of accident prevention to the extent that the larger 
companies have. The programs of small companies are not as 
complete nor as intensive. 
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The comparison between Class A plants and Class B 
plants showed that Class B plants, the larger size group, had 
more complete safety programs and, evidently, the better safety 
* 16, p.28 
record. Large companies, not explored in the body of the 
thesis, have set some remarkable safety records. American 
Bosch Corp. worked 15,039,298 man-hours, and the E. I. DuPont 
De Nemours & Co. worked 28,132,583 man-hours without a lost-
time accident.* 
c. Present and Future 
Large companies have been the first to fully 
utilize accident prevention methods and techniques. Through 
accident prevention programs they have achieved substantial 
reductions in their accident rates. 
Now the safety movement is being more and more 
accepted and utilized by smaller business units. The great-
est booster of accident prevention for small business has 
been the better realization on the part of managements of 
the true costs of accidents and the relative ease of their 
prevention. Safety consciousness and cost consciousness has 
been further augmented by the work of insurance companies, 
government agencies, and independent organizations such as 
the National Safety Council. More and more employers in small 
plants realize that an investment in accident prevention pays 
off and they are instituting safety in both a formal and 
informal manner. -1~* 
It is well to speak in general terms and deal with 
statistics, but it must be remembered that each company is a 
* 16, p.42: 
**18, 19, 20, 21, 22 
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s eparate entity and has i t s own saf ety problem. The case stud-
ies illustra t e this point clearly. Ac ci dent pre vention is an 
individual problem that each employer must face on an individ-
ual basis. The approach and resolution of each problem are, 
:tn turn, dependent upon the attitude and ability of each 
individual employer or manager. 
106 
APPENDIX 
LIST OF REPORTING COMPANIES 
Boston 
American Can Co., 31 Midway St., South Boston 
Apt Sandler Mi'g. Co., 43 Leon St. 
Armour & Company, 775 Columbus Ave. 
Assoc. Folding Box Co., 24 Binford St., So. Boston 
Emile Bernat & Sons Co., 99 Bickford St., Ja. Plain 
Brigham's Inc., Dorothy Muriel Division, 33 Everett St., 
Allston 
Buck Printing Co., 145 Ipswich St. 
Chamberlain's Div. of Armour & Co., 27 Blackstone St. 
Cole-Hersee Co., 20 Old Colony Ave., So. Boston 
Commercial Filters Corp., 18W. 3rd St., So. Boston 
Court Square Press Inc., 1020 Washington St. 
Davidson Rubber Co., 77 North Washington St. 
Donnelly Ele~tric & Mfg. Co., 3050 Washington St. 
Drake Bakeries Inc., 85 Savin St., Roxbury 
French, Schriner & Urner Mfg. Co., 443 Albany St. 
Garland Knitting Mills, 117 Bickford St., Ja. Plain 
General Alloys Co., 405W. First St., So. Boston 
General Baking Co., 853 Albany St. 
Globe Knitting Mills Inc., 575 Albany St. 
Haffenreffer & Co., Inc., 30 Germanial St., Ja. Plain 
Jeanalan Products Co., 10 Thatcher St. 
Liberty Dress House, 35 Kneeland St. 
Mason-Neilan Regulator Co., 1190 Adams St., Dorchester 
Miller & Hollis, Inc., 65 Beverly St. 
Northern Industrial Chemical Co., 11 Elkins St., So. Boston 
Picariello & Singer, Inc., 183 Orleans St., So. Boston 
A. Pritzker & Sons, Inc., 1020 Washington St. 
Recording and Statistical Corp., 183 Essex St. 
Spaulding-Moss Co., 42 Franklin St. 
Star Brush Mfg. Co., 700 Harrison Ave. 
Tileston & Hollingsworth Co., 892 River St. 
A. J. Tower Co., 24 Simmons St. 
The Tudor Press Inc., 251 Causeway St. 
Nathaniel Tufts Meter Works, American Meter Co., Inc., 
455 Commercial St. 
u.s. Gypsum Co., 600 Chelsea St., Charlestown 
Wales Mfg. Co., 307 Center St., Ja. Plain 
s. A. Woods Machine Co., 27 Damrell St., So. Boston 
Cambridge 
Badger Mfg. Co., 260 Bent St. 
Barbour Stockwell Co., 205 Broadway 
Blanchard Machine Co., The, 64 State St. 
Boston Athletic Shoes Co., 25 Thorndike St. 
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Carter's Ink Co., The, 239 First St. 
Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 84 Sidney St. 
Greer, J. w., Co., 119-137 Windsor St. 
Irving & Casson (A. H. Davenport Co.), 26 Otis St. 
Myerson Tooth Corp., 90 Hamilton St. 
National Biscuit Co., 129 Franklin St. 
Sanborn Co., 39 Osborn St. 
Sawyer, H. M., & Son Co., The, 20 Thorndike St., 
E. Cambridge 
Warren Bros. Roads Co., 38 Memorial Drive 
Webster, F. s., Co., 1-23 Amherst St. 
Welch, James o., Co., 810 Main St. 
Chelsea 
Atwood & McManus Box Co., {New England Box Co.) Vale St. 
Beacon Supply Co., 110 Marginal St. 
Panther-Panco Rubber Co., Inc., 31 Highland Ave. 
Smith, A. L., Iron Co., 217 Everett Ave. 
Everett 
Bunny Bear, Inc., 210 Broadway 
Esso Standard Oil Co., 30 Beacham St. 
Market Forge Co., 35 Garvey St. 
Sexton Can Co., Inc., 31 Cross St. 
Warren Pipe Co. of Mass., Inc., 16 Kippy St. 
Malden 
Friend Bros., Inc., 730 Eastern Ave. 
Lawson Machine & Tool Corp., 120 Mountain Ave. 
Revere Knitting Mills, Inc., 124 Eastern Ave. 
Medford 
New England Bedding Co., 50 Amaranth Ave. 
Simmons Co., 600 Mystic Valley Parkway 
Worcester Paper Box Corp., Fellsway and Myrtle Sts. 
Melrose 
Friend Brothers, Inc., 407 Main St. 
Newton 
Sherman Paper Products Corp., 156 Oak St., Newton Upper 
Falls 
Stowe-Woodward, Inc., 181 Oak St., Newton Upper Falls 
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Quincy 
Mathewson Machine Works, Inc., 2 Hancock St. 
Procter & Gamble Mfg Co., The, 780 Washington St. 
Revere 
Hy-Sil Mfg. , Co., 28 Spring Ave. 
Somerville 
Consolidated Paper Box Co., Inc., 6 Vernon St. 
International Paper Co., Clyde and Warwick Sts. 
Stoneham 
Marilyn Sandal Corp., 426 Main St. 
Waltham 
New England Mica Co., 66 Woerd Ave. 
Nichols, W. H., & Sons, 48 Woerd Ave. 
Vanta Co., The, 37 River St. 
Watertown 
Haartz-Mason Inc., 270 Pleasant St. 
Manning, Maxwell & Moore, Inc., 65 Grove St. 
Woburn 
Atlantic Gelatin Div., General Foods Corp., 209 New 
Boston St. 
Consolidated Chemical Industries, Inc., New Boston St. 
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LETTER ACCOMPANYING QUESTIONNAIRE 
December 15, 1953· 
Gentlemen: 
I am a graduate student at Boston University 
studying for a degree as Master of Business Administra-
tion, having already received a degree of Bachelor of 
Science in Industrial Engineering from Northeastern 
University, class of 1953. 
An important part of my present course is the 
writing of a thesis. I have chosen as my topic, "·To 
examine and evaluate accident prevention procedures and 
techniques employed by indust:P.tal concerns in the 
Greater Boston area having more than 100 and less than 
500 employees." 
If you can spare the time required to complete the 
enclosed questionnaire and to return it to me in the 
enclosed, se lf-addressed, stamped envelope, it would 
be very helpful to a young man who will soon be seeking 
employment in the business world. 
All . information received will be converted into 
statistics, and all names of companies and informants 
will be kept strictly confidential. 
Your assistance will be sincerely appreciated. 
WCT/JVG 
Very truly yours, 
William c. Turner 
2.0 Juniper Avenue 
Salem, Massachusetts 
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QUESTIONNAIRE 
CLASSIFICATION: Please check appropriate answers. 
1. How many persons are employed by your company? 
100 to 250-( ) 250 to 500-( ) 
If your company employs less than 50 or more than 500 
persons, do not bother to fill out the remainder of 
t h is questionnaire. 
ORGM~IZATION: Please check appropriate answers. 
2. What type of safety organization does your company 
employ? safety carried on by line executives-( ) full-
time safety director-( ) safety committee-( ) 
aa. If a committee organization is employed, how often 
does thesafety committee meet? weekly-( ) semi-
monthly-( ) monthly-( ) bi-monthly-( ) 
annually-( ) irregularly-( ) 
2b. If a committee organization is employed, who 
attends the meetings? employees-( ) first-line 
supervision-( ) top management~( ) middle 
management-( ) insurance company's safety 
engineer-( ) 
2c. If a committee organization is employed, how many 
members does the committee have? 1 to 5-{ ) 
6 to 10-( ) 11 to 15-( ) 16 to 20-( ) 25 and 
u:p-\ ) 
3. Does your safety organization work in conjunction with 
the safety engineer of your workmen's compensation 
insurance carrier? yes-( ) no-( ) to a limited 
extent-( ) 
4. Has your company ever had a foremen's safety training 
program? yes-( ) no-( ) 
I NVE STIGATION AND CORRECTION: (Other than legal requirements> 
5. Does your company's safety organization ~nvestigate all 
lost-time accidents?· yes-( ) no-( ) 
6. Are written reports of the facts of each lost-time 
accident made and kept on file by your company? yes-( ) 
no-( ) 
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7. Does your company take corrective action after each 
accident to prevent recur:r.e_nce? yes-( ) no-( ) 
8. Does your company also investigate accidents which do 
not result in lost time? yes-( ) no-( ) 
INTEREST: 
9. Please check all of the following techniques that your 
company has used to stimulate employee interest. 
bulletin boards ( ) displays ( ) 
posters ( ) contests ( ) 
signs and slogans ( ) foremen talks ( ) 
trade magazines ( ) plant magazines ( ) 
newspaper articles ( ) manuals ( ) 
notices in pay envelopes ( ) 
COSTS: 
10. Please estimate your company's yearly expenditure 
(personnel, time, improv~ment of fa,cilitie~) on acci-
dent prevention. up to ~100-( ) ~100 to $500-( ) 
$1 , 000 to $2,000-( ) $2,000 to $5,000-( ) $5,000 
and up-( ) 
COMMENTS: Use the space below and the back of this sheet if 
desired. 
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ACCIDENT PREVENTION FOR SUPERVISORS# 
CONFERENCE LEADERS GUIDE 
PROCEDURE CONCLUSIONS 
CONFERENCE NO. 1 - ACCIDENT FACTORS 
1. Break the ice. 
2. Arrange introductions all 
round. 
3. Pass sheet around for name 
and positions. 
4. Define wCONFERENCE". 
5. Tell time, place, length 
of meetings. 
6. Introduce subject of acci-
dent~. 
7. Compile list of COMMON 
ACCIDENTS. 
8. Seek definition of ACCI-
..___ 
DENTS. 
9. Exa~1ne list of board. 
10. Bring out factors in 
sequence. 
11. Demonstrate Accident 
Sequence. 
12. Consider SUPERVISORS 
part. 
13. Demonstrate altered 
sequence. 
8. A.ccidents are MISHAPS 
CAUSED by Unsafe Acts 
or Unsafe Conditions 
or a combination of the 
two. 
12. The MOST EFFECTIVE thing 
a supervisor can do to 
prevent accidents is to 
recognize and correct 
these Unsafe Acts and 
Unsafe Condistions when 
making his rounds. 
#Used by Employer's Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd. 
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PROCEDURE 
14. Consider BEST TIME 
for Superviaor~pre­
vent accidents. 
115 
CONCLUSIONS 
14. Accident Prevention is part 
of production, not apart 
from. 
CONFERENCE NO. 2 - A.CCIDENT CAUSES 
1. Have conclusions on 
board. 
2. Review accident sequence. 
3. Check acceptance on 
conclusions. 
4. Substitue middle domino. 
5. Substitute a study of 
causes. 
6. Pu t chart on board. 
7. Seek COMM ON causes. 
8. Compare with STANDARD 
causes. 
9. Discuss Unsafe Acta va 
Unsafe Conditions. --
10. Poll group for PRINCIPAL 
causes. 
11. Discuss value of recog -
nition ALONE. 
12. Suggest dealing with 
Cor r ection of Unsafe 
CONDITI ONS. 
13. List ha l f dozen unsafe 
conditions. 
14. Check off those WITHIN 
Supervisor's authority 
to correct. 
15. Discuss methods of cor-
r ecting this type. 
5. Accidents have definite 
and TANGIBLE causes. 
(Unsafe Acts and Unsafe 
Conditions.) 
7. Accidents do not JUST 
HAPPEN, they are CAUSED. 
11. Recognition is the FIRST 
STEP i n accident preven-
tion. 
12. Correction is the KEY to 
a·ccident preven tion.-
PROCEDURE 
16. Discuss necessary Super-
visor's action regarding 
others BEYOND his author-
ity. 
17. Draw organization chart 
showing FLOW OF REPORTS 
and position Of SAFETY 
ENGINEER. 
18. Discuss common problems 
leading to need of UNI-
FORM, WRITTEN REPOR'TS':'" 
19. Suggest details to be 
worked out in later 
Safety meetings. 
CONCLUSIONS 
17. Supervisory ACTION is 
necessary to CORRECT 
Unsafe Conditions. 
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CONFERENCE NO. 3 - ELIMINATION OF CAUSES 
1. Have conclusions on 
board, 
2. Review Accident Sequence. 
3. Review Coneensus of group 
regarding Unsafe Acts as 
principle cause. 
4. List REASONS for Unsafe 
Acts (personal faults.) 
5~ . Underline those indicat-
ing LACK OF knowledge or 
skil-r:---
6. Discuss NATURE of Cor-
rective Action. 
7. Check those indicating 
ATTITUDES. 
8. Discuss NATURE of Cor-
rective Action. 
9. Circle those indicat-
ing personal DEFECTS. 
3. Majority of accidents are 
caused PRINCIPALLY by 
Unsafe Acts. 
4. The Supervisor must find the 
REASON behind the Unsafe Act 
to apply SUITABLE corrective 
action. 
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PROCEDURE CONCLUSIONS 
10. Discuss NATURE of Cor- 10. Job INSTRUCTION, Good 
rective Action. DISCIPLINE, Proper PLACE-
1~NT are effective Super-
11. Poll group to deter- visory tools to prevent 
mine RELATIVE impor- accident. 
tance. 
12. Discuss Placement 12. Supervisor must put a man 
Problems. on a job he is ABLE to do, 
or able to be taught to 
1.3. Discuss Discipline do. 
(positive and negative) 13. Good Discipline is the 
emphasizing difference RESULT of that kind of 
between DISCIPLINE and LEADERSHIP which makes 
PENALTY. PENALTY rarely necessary. 
CONFERENCE NO. 4 - ELTIYIINATION OF CAUSES 
1. Have conclusions on 
board. 
2. Review Accident sequence. 
3. Discuss Instruction. 
4. List TIPS FOR INSTRUCTORS 
on board. --
5. Suggest a PLAN or arrange-
ment of these tips. 
6. Point out ease of die-
cussing value if made 
more tangible. 
7. Suggest we teach someone 
to do a job in order to 
discuss EFFECTIVE methods 
of instructing. 
8. Select a man to come 
forward. (One who cannot 
do the job.) 
9. TELL him how to do the 
job. 
10. SHOW him how to do the 
job. 
PROCEDURE 
11. As man fails, seek MORE 
TIPS for the list on---
board. 
12. Suggest a DEMONSTRATION. 
13. DEMONSTRATE and explain 
until man learns. 
14. Thank man for co-operation 
as he returns to seat. 
15. Compare techniques USED 
to t ips ON LIST. 
16. Suggest we arrange and 
complete these tips into 
a PLAN for teaching ANY 
JO~ -
17. LAYOUT or DEVELOP tech-
niques of Instructing on 
board , 
18. Discuss steps as time 
allows. 
19. DISTRIBUTE "Technique of 
Instructing. tt: 
CONCLUSIONS 
11. If the LEARNER hasn't 
LEARNED the INSTRUCTOR 
hasn't 'JlAUGHT. 
13. Demonstration is the 
ONLY EFFECTIVE method 
~eacfilng Job SKILLS. 
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CONFERENCE NO. 5 - ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION 
1. Have conclusions on 
board. 
2. Review Accident Sequence. 
3. Write on board and dis-
cuss:. When an employee 
has been hurt in this 
plant, WHAT Action should 
be taken, and BY WHOM to 
prevent recurrenc~ 
4. Discuss "WHICH a·ccidents 
shall we apply this to?" 
2. All a·ccidents are CAUSED 
and SUITABLE corrective 
action must be taken to 
PREVENT RECURRENCE. 
3. As soon AFTER an accident 
as possible the Foreman 
should GET the STORY, 
FIND alr-the causes and 
TAKE suitable corrective 
action. 
PROCEDURE 
5. Discuss value of WRITTEN 
~ccident reports. 
6. Distribute plant's pres-
ent form used to report 
investigation. 
?. Discuss items on form. 
8. Distribute a form geared 
to this conference and to 
conclusions reached. 
(Not necessary if plant's 
present form is O.K.) 
9. Seek comments regarding 
form. 
· 10. Suggest a tryout of the 
most acceptable form. 
11. Write a discription of 
an accident on the board. 
12~. List probable causes 
given by group. 
13. Discuss SUI TABLE correc-
tive action. 
14. Point out the GUESS WORK 
except by foreman wh_o __ _ 
KNOWS the man. 
15. Write another accident 
story on board. 
16. Ask group to fill out 
form. 
17. Promote discussion as to 
causes and corrective 
a:ction. 
18. Emphasize uncertainty of 
corrective action of Unsafe 
Acts. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
5. WRITTEN accident reports 
get top management atten-
tion and help. They 
provide basis of ~plant 
wise" accident causes and 
help the foreman in his 
investigation. 
14. To be certain of the 
PROPER corrective action, 
the FOREMAN must analyze 
the accident. 
18. Foremen know their men. 
ONLY the foreman can 
determine the PERSONAL 
FAULT and take sound cor-
rective action. 
PROCEDURE 
19. Repeat Steps 15 through 
18 as time allows. 
120 
CONCLUSIONS 
CONFERENCE NO. 6 - EMPLOYEE SAFEGUARDS 
1. Have conclusions on board. 
2. Review accident sequence. 
3. List the various items 
used in the plant. 
4. Discuss me thods of procur-
ing by the employee. 
5. Discuss responsibility and 
methods for instructing 
men in use of items. 
6. Discuss methods of clean-
ing, testing, servicing, 
repairing. 
7. Seek recommendation for 
I MPROVEMENT of the above. 
8. Prepare to close conference. 
9. Summarize high lights of 
conference. 
10. Distribute "Conference 
High Lights." 
11. Close conference. 
5. Employee Safeguards must 
be USED EFFICIENTLY to 
prevent injury. 
9. Accident prevention is a 
continuous job varied on 
while a supervisor is making 
his rounds. 
SAFETY CONFERENCES FOR SUPERVISORS AND MANAGERS 
High Lights of Conferences 
1. Accidents are MISHAPS CAUSED by Unsafe Acts or Unsafe 
Conditions or a combination of the two. 
~. The MOST EFFECTIVE thing we can do to prevent accidents 
is to recognize and correct these Unsafe Acts and Unsafe 
Conditions when making his rounds. 
3. Accident Prevention is a part of production, not apart 
from. 
4. Accidents have TANGIBLE causes. (Unsafe Acts and Unsafe 
Conditions.) 
5. Accidents do not JUST HAPPEN, they are CAUSED. 
&• Recognition is the FIRST STEP in accident prevention. 
7. Cor-rection is the KEY to accident prevention. 
8. Supervisor can ALWAYS do SOMETHING to reduce danger of an 
Unsafe Condition. 
9.. Ma·jori ty of accidents are caused PRINCIPALLY by Unsafe 
Acts. 
10. The supervisor must find the REASON behind the Unsafe 
Acts to apply SUITABLE corrective action. 
11. Proper PLACEMENT, effective INSTRUCTION, and good 
DISCIPLINE prevent unsafe acts. 
12. New man must be able to do job or have aptitude for 
training. 
13. Good discipline is the RESULT of that kind of LEADERSHIP 
which makes penalty rarely necessary. 
14. If the LEARNER hasn't LEARNED, the INSTRUCTOR hasn't 
TAUGHT. 
15. Demonstration is the ONLY EFFECTIVE method of teaching 
Job SKILLS. 
16. All accidents are CAUSED, and SUITABLE corrective action 
must be taken to PREVENT RECURRENCE. 
12J. 
17. As soon AFTER an accident as possible, the Supervisor 
should GET the STORY, FIND, and TAKE suitable corrective 
action. 
18. WRITTEN accident reports ste·er the Supervisor in his 
investigation and provide a basis for plant w,ide acci-
dent problems to be corrected. 
19. To be certain of the PROPER corrective action, the 
Supervisor must analyze the accident. 
20. Supervisors know their men. They can determine the 
PERSONAL FAULT and take suitable corrective action. 
21. ACCIDENT PREVENTION is a CONTINUOUS JOB carried on while 
a supervisor is making his rounds. 
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SUPERVISOR'S REPORT OF ACCIDENT 
THIS I"ORM MUST BE COMPLETED AND SENT TO--------------------------------------
WITHIN 24 HOURS AFTER AN ACCIDENT WHICH RESULTS IN AN INJURY. 
PART I- GENERAL INFORMATION 
NAME OF INJURED DEPT. 
DATE OF ACCIDENT HOUR A . M . P . M . EXACT LOCATION -------------------
JOB OR ACTIVITY AT TIME OF ACCIDENT 
PART II -DESCRIPTION OF ACCIDENT (WHAT HAPPENED?) 
PART Ill -THE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT 
A. DESCRIBE ANY UNSAFE AC:t"S ---------------------------'---------------------~ 
B . DESCRIBE ANY UNSAFE CONDITIONS -----------------------------------------
~ 
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PART IV.- CORRECTIVE ACTION TAKEN (CHECK ONE OR MORE) 
( IF CAUSED BY UNSAFE ACTS) 
INSTRUCTED INJURED MAN-------------------
INSTRUCTED OTHERS 
WARNED INJURED MAN-------- -------------
WARNED OTHERS 
REASSIGNED INJURED MAN .-------------------
RECOMMENDED TRANSFER-------------------
RECOMMENDED DISCHARG""---------- ----------
OTHER ACTION--------------- -----------
EXPLAIN SPECIFICALLY THE CORRECTIVE ACTION CHECKED ABOVE( 
(DATE OF THIS REPO>tT) 
( IF CAUSED BY UNSAFE CONDITIONS) 
ELIMINATED CONDITION _____________ ___ _____ _ 
GUARDED THE CO"'DITION _______________ __;__ ___ _ 
WARNED OTHERS ------------- -----------
REPORTED CONDITION TO------------ - - --------
OTHER ACTION __ ~----------------------
(SIGNATURE OF .SUPERVISOR) 
NOTE:- THIS FORM DOES NOT TAKE THE PLACE OF THE REGULAR ACCIDENT REPORT REQUIRED BY YOUR INSURANCE COMPANY OR ANY 
LEGAL FORM TO BE FILED WITH STATE BOARD. 
(USE OTHER SIDE IF ADDITIONAL SPACE IS REQUIRED) 
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